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I. INTRODUCTION
In many situations involving multiple forces, it is clear that one
or a number of tortious actors did not injure the victim.' Courts
insist that in these cases there is no causal link between the noninjuring actor's behavior and the victim's harm. Yet, they
nevertheless hold them liable. This Article focuses on three such
celebrated paradigms that have proven to be both vexing and
immune to analysis. The first type-concerted action situationsdeals with cases where actors, while pursuing a common plan,
engage in a tortious activity that harms the victim. A standard
example is a drag race where a pedestrian hit by one driver can
also recover from other drivers and even spectators. 2 The second
type-concurrent causes 3-includes situations where a number of
independent forces join and harm the victim. Here, the classic
example is of two fires, which merge and destroy the victim's
cabin. Courts openly declare that neither fire can be said to be the
actual cause of the victim's harm but, despite the alleged lack of
causation, impose liability on all tortious actors. 4 The third typealternative liability cases-involves cases like Summers v. Tice,
where two hunters carelessly shot in the victim's direction.5
Although it was clear that one of the hunters did not injure the
victim, the court held both liable.6
Courts have developed different theories to impose liability on
the non-injuring actors. From the least to most controversial,
these include concerted action, substantial factor, and alternative
1 A tortious actor can be a non-injuring party. For example, consider a scenario in which
A, encouraged by B, a spectator, punches V. Both A and B act tortiously, although it is clear
that only A is the injurer (B is the non-injuring tortious party). For a similar use of these
terms, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

26

cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (defining the term "tortious conduct").
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. c, illus. 2, cmt. d, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST.
1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.

§

15 cmt. a, illus. 1 (AM.

LAW INST. 2000); see also infra notes 77-81.
3 The term "concurrent causes," as used here, refers to situations where multiple
independent forces combine and harm the victim. These forces can be necessary or
unnecessary, sufficient or insufficient, simultaneous or sequential (as when the victim's
cabin is consumed by two fires, one of which reached the cabin earlier in time).
4 See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 48
(Minn. 1920) (explaining that if two fires unite "there is joint and several liability, even
though either fire would have destroyed plaintiffs property"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (applying the substantial factor test).
5 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1-2 (Cal. 1948).
6 Id. at 3.
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liability.7 Although the reasoning behind these doctrines and the
conditions necessary for their application vary considerably, there
seems to be a consensus that "[i]n all these cases the requirement
of proving [actual] causation is relaxed."5 Actors who clearly did
not "cause" the victim's injury (such as the spectator in the drag
race or the hunter who missed Summers) are held liable for a
wrong committed by another. The reason for "relaxing" the actual
causation requirement is twofold. The first reason is fairness to
The argument is that the victim who suffered
the victim.
injustice-"a harm ... caused by the wrongful conduct of
another"-deserves to be compensated.9 The second reason for
imposing liability on careless actors who admittedly did not injure
the victim is to deter them from what is perceived as an
antisocial10 and inefficient activity." Liability expresses a social
distaste and "moral condemnation for the actions of all of the
defendants." 12 It is meant to incentivize them to take care and
avoid putting others at risk. 13
7 For an explanation of these doctrines, see infra Sections IV.A, IV.B, and notes 122-24
and accompanying text, respectively.
8 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2008)
(explaining actual causation is relaxed "because otherwise there would be a wrong and an
injury but no remedy"); see also Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 515 (N.J. 1989)
(noting that "'concert of action,' with its offspring, 'enterprise liability' [and] alternative
liability" are exceptions to the otherwise "indispensable" cause in fact requirement). Some
scholars note that the actual causation requirement in these cases is outright abandoned.
See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 97 (1956)
(noting that it "seems sensible" that courts "should be free to abandon" the cause-in-fact
requirement).
9 Richard W. Wright, Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability,

and the Burden of Proof, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1300 (2008).
10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.

§

15 reporters' note,

cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (noting that liability in concerted action cases expresses "moral
condemnation"); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 41, at 266-68 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON] (discussing the
but-for and substantial-factor rules); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27; David A.
Fischer, ProductsLiability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623,
1629, 1633 (1981) (explaining that in Summers "each defendant's conduct was
unquestionably of an antisocial nature" and noting the law of causation "seeks
to . . . discourage socially undesirable activity"); see also infra note 18.
11 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 212 (Vickin Been et al. eds., 9th
ed. 2014) (discussing the economics of holding non-injuring tortfeasors liable); MICHAEL
FAURE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 84 (2009); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

ACCIDENT LAW 108 (1987) (discussing the economics of causation and the use of liability to
induce "optimal behavior").
12
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§ 15

reporters' note, cmt. a

(AM. LAW INST. 2000); see also Boim, 549 F.3d at 697 (noting that group causation theories
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This Article offers a novel approach for analyzing multiple
causes situations where the victim suffers an indivisible harm.
First, it debunks the myth that group causation theories, such as
concerted action, substantial factor, and alternative liability, are
fair to the victim or that they are designed to promote
deterrence.14 In deviation from the prior literature, this Article
shows that these group causation theories share an important
feature.
Under certain conditions, they reduce the parties'
incentives to take care and may result in more, not fewer, injuries.
In other words, group causation theories may well be the very
reason the victim suffers injustice in the form of harm to her
person or property. To illustrate this point, consider Example 1
below:
Example 1: A Drag Race.
A number of actors
consider whether to engage in a drag race. Each can
estimate her own benefit from the activity but not
others'. The benefit can be tangible (e.g., a promised
prize) or intangible (e.g., the thrill from the ride,
breaking the law, or even harming someone). For
simplicity, assume that each participant expects to
benefit $40 from the activity. The expected harm to
the victim is $90. Each driver can avoid harming the
victim if she invests $35 in precaution.
To understand
consisting of two
party, each driver
she can expect a

the multi-party dynamic, first consider a party
individuals, for example, two drivers. In this
is better off taking care. 15 If a driver takes care,
gain of $5 (40-35). In contrast, if she drives

seek to avoid a situation in which there is "a wrong and an injury by no remedy");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.

FOR PHYSICAL AND

EMOTIONAL

HARM

§

27

(explaining the rationale behind multiple sufficient causation); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 10, § 41, at 267; infra note 18 and accompanying text.
1s See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
14 The term "group causation theories," as used here, simply refers to theories courts say
they apply to "relax" the actual causation requirement in the three paradigmatic cases. It is
not meant to imply that a collective caused the harm as suggested by Mark Geistfeld. Mark
Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 447, 452-53 (2006); see also infra note 170 and accompanying text.
15 In order to first analyze the effect of the tort system, the example ignores the
possibility that the same activity can give rise to both civil and criminal liability. The
effects of the criminal system on the parties' incentives are explored later in Section IV.c.
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carelessly, she can only expect a loss. 16 Next, consider a party
consisting of three individuals, for example, the same two drivers
and a spectator who encourages them to race. Now the parties'
incentives change dramatically. Each driver is better off if both
drive carelessly. This is because under concerted action theory,
everyone-the two careless drivers and the spectator who
encourages them-will be held liable. This means that each can
Now driving carelessly is
expect to pay only $30 (90/3).17
worthwhile. With a benefit of $40 and an expected loss of $30,
each driver can expect to gain $10 (40-30)-twice the gain
This explains the parties'
compared to driving carefully.
agreement to race carelessly. The result is that concerted action
18
theory-a theory that is premised on fairness and deterrence
can dilute the actors' expected liability to the point that neither
will have an incentive to take care. In the drag race hypothetical,
tort law encourages the very "antisocial" behavior it purports to
condemn.
Second, this Article challenges the consensus that group
causation theories abandon the actual causation requirement.
Like the prior literature, this Article concedes that in these cases
tort law holds liable parties who did not injure the victim (e.g., the
spectator). Yet, in deviation from this prior literature, this Article
shows that a non-injuring party can nevertheless be a but-for
reason for the victim's harm. This is well illustrated by Example
1.19 Recall that as part of a group of two drivers, each is better off
taking care. Yet, the same two careful drivers would agree to
drive carelessly if a spectator encourages them. The spectator is
thus an actual cause of the harm. Indeed, but for the spectator's

16 If one driver drives carelessly, she can expect to pay $90, gain $40, and lose $50 (4090). If both drive carelessly, each can expect to pay $45 (90/2), gain $40, and thus lose $5
(40-45). The result is a dominant strategy to take care. Each driver is better off taking care
regardless of the other's actions.
17 With some simplifying assumptions it is possible to show that the expected liability of
each party is independent of the apportionment regime (whether it is joint and several
liability, several liability, or any other regime). See J. Shahar Dillbary, Apportioning
Liability Behind a Veil of Uncertainty, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1729, 1756-69 (2011) (modeling the
effect of different apportionment regimes); see also infra Part IV.
1s See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 n.19 (Mich. 1984) (noting that
concerted action "seems to have developed to deter hazardous group behavior"); Lyons v.
Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) ("The purpose

of this theory is . . . to deter anti-social behavior.").
19 See supra p. 5.
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tortious conduct, the driver who hit the pedestrian would have
taken care and the pedestrian would not have been harmed. Note
that in Example 1 it was not the words or gestures of
encouragement that enticed the careless driving. Rather, it was
the law of causation. It was the knowledge that under concerted
action theory, all participants (including the spectator) would
shoulder the cost of an accident that made it worthwhile for the
injuring driver to forgo taking care and hit the victim. The result
is that each of the parties is an actual cause and thus equally
responsible for the harm. This includes the party who did not
injure the victim (e.g., the non-hitting driver) 20 and a party who
could not have hit the victim (e.g., the spectator). A similar
dynamic occurs in the case of alternative liability and concurrent
causes situations. 21
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II
reviews the prior economic literature and shows its deficiencies.
This literature, for the most part, ignores the challenges that
multiple causes cases pose. Members of the law and economics
movement often mention one of the paradigmatic cases but neglect
to explain why the law imposes liability on actors who did not
injure the victim.

22

This is hardly surprising given that one

important line of this literature is explicitly willing to dispose of
causation altogether. 23 Another strand of the literature views
causation as a means to limit the scope of liability. It argues that
"too little" liability-holding an injurer liable for only a portion of
20 To see why the harm is unlikely to occur absent the non-hitting driver,
consider a case
in which one driver is encouraged to drive carelessly by a third party (e.g., a passenger or
spectator). If the driver agrees to drive carelessly, she can expect to pay $45 (90/2) and lose
$5 (40-45). Accordingly, the driver will take care for an expected gain of $5 (40-35). But if
the party includes three individuals-for example, the same driver and spectator and
another driver-both drivers will be better off if they drive carelessly. Because under
concerted action theory each driver will be held liable, regardless of whether she hits the
pedestrian, each of the drivers can expect to pay $30 (90/3) and thus gain $10 (40-30). The
result is that but for the non-injuring driver's tortious behavior, the hitting driver would
take care and the harm would be avoided.
21 See infra Part III (discussing the parties' incentives) and Section IV.A (discussing
actual causation).
22 Cooter and Ulen, for example,
discuss Summers simply as an example of an
unintentional tort. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 188 (6th ed.
2011). They later revisit the example only to explain that "[u]nder traditional rules of tort
liability, only the hunter who actually caused the harm is liable; the hunter who missed is
not liable." Id. at 201. See also SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 109 (noting that determining
"which of several archers shot the arrow that struck the [victim]" can be hard to ascertain).
23 See infra note 28 and accompanying
text.
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the harm she inflicted-may result in sub-optimal care levels; "too
much" liability-holding one liable for an injury she did not
inflict-may result in sub-optimal activity levels.
In deviation from this literature, Part III shows that in the
context of multiple causes, "too little" liability can actually lead to
optimal care levels, and "too much" liability can increase activity
24
levels. Building on a model I developed elsewhere, I show that
group causation theories encourage group wrongdoing, or a
"tortfest," and that doing so can be socially desirable. 25 Moreover,
24 J. Shahar Dillbary, Tortfest, 80 U. CHI. L. REV 953, 958 (2013) (focusing on socially
beneficial activities in alternative care situations-that is, cases where either party alone
can avoid the harm). The cases discussed here, on the other hand, are for the most part
joint-care cases. To avoid the victim's harm, a number of parties must take care. Moreover,
this Article explains how causation doctrines incentivizes the parties to engage in tortfests.
25 In Example 1, behaving carelessly in a group of three or more actors is socially
desirable if one assumes with the law (although judges vehemently deny) that the pleasure
to the tortious actors from the activities and even the harming of others, should be given
weight. The private benefits of the actors are discussed in Section III.c, infra. Under this
view, taking care will result in an expected welfare-gain of $15 (40x3-35x3), whereas if
neither takes care, total welfare will double to $30 (40x3-90). This assumes, for simplicity
and without loss of generality, that the spectator, like the drivers, benefits $40 from
(watching) the race and that she will incur a cost of $35 if she exercises care (e.g., the cost of
restraining herself from encouraging the parties). Another assumption is that there are no
market alternatives. Here, you should note that although the activity is productive, in the
sense that it generates benefits (to the actors) and is thus different than a mere transfer of
wealth (as theft would be), it is still coercive. The victim did not consent to the activity. A
market transaction, that is an agreement between the actors and the would-be victim,
would be preferable for a number of reasons. First, it would ensure that the actors' benefits
from the activity outweigh the cost to the victim. The seller (the would-be victim) would not
permit the activity unless she is fully compensated. In contrast, if the parties are able to
bypass the market-for example, if they can destroy the victim's $90 car first and then pay
damages according to some objective measure-the result may be inefficient if the actors
pay less than the victim's reservation price. Indeed, if two actors believe that they can
escape liability altogether (i.e., pay nothing) or pay only $50, even two actors would engage
in a race without taking care (40x2>0,50) although this would be socially undesirable
(80<90). See also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1125 (1972) (explaining that requiring
actors to pay "an objectively determined value of the property stolen [or otherwise taken]
would be to convert all property rule entitlements into liability rule entitlements" and
warning that "[1]iability rules represent only an approximation of the value of the object to
its original owner and willingness to pay such an approximate value is no indication that it
is worth more to the thief than to the owner"). A liability rule could also encourage
potential victims to over-invest in precaution and under-invest in capital. For these reasons
the law discourages actors from bypassing the market (e.g., by imposing punitive damages
in the case of intentional torts). However, a liability rule can be justified when a market
solution is not available in order to effectuate a productive activity, as in cases where the
actors cannot negotiate with each other or with the potential victims. See also Dillbary,
supra note 24, at 959, 973-74 ("Traditional theory explains the need to impose liability
(often referred as a 'liability rule') in high-transaction cost settings."); infra notes 69-77
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under certain conditions, the more tortfeasors engage in the
activity-the more shooters, the more drivers and spectators
attend the race, and the more actors set fires that merge-the
more welfare is enhanced. In these cases, group causation theories
define the pool of defendants whose liability must be diluted in
order to encourage welfare-enhancing accidents.
Part IV-the heart of the paper-turns to debunk the consensus
that group causation theories like concerted action, substantial
factor, and alternative liability abandon the actual causation
requirement. Section IV.A shows that courts and scholars have
been too quick to concede that the but-for test fails in cases of
concerted action, concurrent causes, and alternative liability. It
reveals that in some cases the tortious behavior of each of the noninjuring parties is necessary to bring about the harm. In other
cases, it seems that no one party is necessary for the harm,
although every party is, and thus that each actor is a but-for
reason for the harm. 26 Finally, this section shows that even in
cases where neither party is necessary for the harm, a
presumption of actual causation against the tortious parties could
increase societal welfare.
Armed with these new insights, Section IV.B turns to offer a
more holistic approach to the seemingly disparate paradigmatic
cases.
Using the simple model and applying it to leading
decisions, this section hypothesizes that the three group causation
doctrines can be, to some extent, interchangeable and provides
some anecdotal evidence that they are. Section IV.c focuses on the
relationship between tort law and criminal law. It investigates
cases where the actors' behaviors may result in both criminal and
civil liability (e.g., drag races). This part shows that in such cases,
the two legal systems seem to clash: criminal law deters the
parties from engaging in activities that tort law, via its group
causation theories may encourage. It then offers an explanation
that is premised in institutional design and provides
recommendations to courts and policy makers.

and accompanying text. A liability rule is also a solution, even if imperfect, to the public
good aspect of the activities discussed in this Article.
26 For example, if four actors engaged in drag racing in Example
1, each participant could
argue that the harm would have occurred even if she acted carefully because of the careless
actions of the other three participants.

10
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Section IV.D uses concurrent causes situations as a case study
to investigate some of the positive and normative implications of
the model. Unlike the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement
(Third), Section IV.D shows that those whose tortious behavior
only contributed trivially to the victim's harm could nevertheless
be a but-for cause of her injury. Thus, to the extent that the lack
of actual causation was the reason to exempt those who
contributed marginally, the exemption, without more, cannot be
justified. Section lV.D also sheds light on cases where multiple
insufficient forces combine-an issue with regard to which the two
Restatements sharply diverge. It explains why parties should be
liable for a harm that none could cause alone. The reasoning is
not premised on the fairness rationales that (mis)guided the
drafters of the Restatements, courts, and scholars. Rather, it is
based on economic theory. It shows that in these cases, each
actor's behavior (whether the force she exerted was insufficient or
her contribution to the harm was trivial) could be an actual cause
of the entire harm.
Part V discusses the assumptions and limitations of the model.
The model does not assume that courts and individuals are
omniscient. Nor does it assume that they can determine the value
each wrongdoer places on the tortious activity or the wrongdoers'
In fact, it assumes the opposite: that
cost of precaution.
costly and that each party can
prohibitively
is
information
estimate her cost and benefit from the activity, but not others'.
Still, the model is limited in scope. To begin with, it focuses on the
three paradigmatic cases. The model also assumes that each party
can engage in ex ante cost-benefit analysis (although it can easily
27
be extended to cases where such calculations are not feasible ).
Part VI analyzes one important alternative to group causation
theories. To date, courts have considered only two options. In the
three paradigmatic cases, the choice, we are told, is whether: (a) to
apply a group causation theory and hold all actors (including noninjuring actors) liable; or (b) exempt these actors from liability and
leave the victim remediless. Part VI then turns to investigate a
third option: the one-party-pays-all rule. Under this rule, liability
for the entire harm is imposed on one party only. This can be the
party who physically injured the victim (if only one such party

27

See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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exists and is known), or someone chosen randomly.
After
analyzing this alternative regime, Part VI shows that, although
under certain conditions, group causation theories and the oneparty-pays-all rule may lead to the same results, from an efficiency
standpoint, it is preferable to apply a group causation theory. Part
VII provides concluding remarks.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF ACTUAL CAUSATION
Actual causation was-and in many ways still is-the black
sheep of the law and economics movement. And, as is often the
case with black sheep, at least one line of the literature-led by
giants like Coase, Landes and Posner, and Calabresi-was willing
to dispose of causation altogether. 28 For them, "a case in which
causation is an issue [can be simply resolved] by asking how the
case should be decided consistently with the [Learned] Hand
formula." 29
Others were willing to recognize a limited economic role for
actual causation. Shavell, for example, focuses on the role of
causation in curbing actors' liability. Too much liability, he
explains, will not affect the optimal level of care, but will result in
over-deterrence (sub-optimal activity levels).30 Too little liability
will result in under-deterrence (sub-optimal levels of care). 31 To

28 See FAURE, supra note 11, at 84 ("The original economic theory of tort law deliberately
rejected an explicit role for a causation doctrine in determining liability."); WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 229 (1987)

(explaining why "the idea of causation can largely be dispensed with in an economic
analysis of torts" and concluding that "the injurer 'causes' the injury when he is the lowercost avoider of it but not otherwise"); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts: An Essay for HarryKalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 85 (1975) ("One could do away
with the but-for test and employ other methods to 'determine' whether avoidance is
worthwhile."); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An
Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 124-25 (1983) (discussing the rationale for
alternative liability and noting that "we can analyze this type of case using a modified Hand
formula without explicitly discussing causation"); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 165 (1973) ("Both Calabresi and Coase, then, share the
belief that the concept of causation should not, because it cannot, play any role in the
determination of liability for harms that have occurred.").
29 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 28, at 229. According to the Hand formula "liability
depends upon whether B [the burden of precaution] is less than L [the severity of the harm]
multiplied by P [the probability of harm]: i.e., whether B < PL." United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
30 SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 108.

s1 Id. at 107-08.
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see why, suppose that engaging in a certain activity (e.g., hunting)
creates a 10% chance that the victim will incur a $100 damage,
and that the cost of taking care is $4. Holding the actor liable for
harm she inflicted will incentivize her to take care. By paying $4
on precaution upfront, she can avoid an expected judgment of $10
(100x10%). Suppose now that, if the actor engages in the activity,
she will be arbitrarily liable for two harms: the harm she inflicted
and a $400 harm that she did not inflict, which materializes at a
20% chance. It is easy to show that the "excess" liability will not
alter the actor's incentive to take care. If she takes care, her
expected liability is $84-the $4 cost of precaution and the $80
(400x20%) expected damages for the harm she did not inflict. If
she does not take care, her expected liability will be higher: $90
(400x20%+100x10%).

32

Either way, taking care reduces

her

expected liability by $6 (from $10 to $4 if she is only liable for
damages she inflicted or from $90 to $84 if she is also liable for the
second harm).
Too much liability, however, can negatively impact activity
levels. Suppose, for example, that the actor in the example above
benefits $7 from the activity. If the actor's liability is limited to
damages she inflicted, she will engage in the activity and take care
($7>$4). But, if the actor is also liable for an additional $400
damage she did not inflict, her expected loss will be so high that
she would forgo the activity ($7<$84 if she takes care or $90 if she
does not). 33

32 A popular example is a cricket field owner who negligently erected a nine-foot fence
instead of a ten-foot (the proper height) fence. Liability should be imposed for balls flying
over nine feet, but below ten feet. Holding the owner liable for balls flying above ten feet is
imposing crushing or unrestricted liability. It will find her liable for harms that would not
have been avoided even if she had taken optimal care. Such crushing liability will not alter

her incentive to take care.

THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMICS APPROACH TO LAW 59-61

(2004); Marcel Kahan, Causationand Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 431-32 (1989).
33 Exempting the actor from the excessive $400 harm she did not inflict may not solve the
sub-optimal activity level concern. It is true that in a perfect negligence system the careful
actor who can expect to be exempted from liability would engage in the activity (7>4). The
tort system, however, is imperfect. It is rife with mistakes and uncertainties. The results
are pockets of strict liability. Parties who took optimal care may nevertheless be held
liable. In the above example, the actor may avoid the activity altogether if she expects to be
liable for more than $7 (e.g., due to a judicial mistake). See MICELI, supra note 32, at 59-61
(discussing the economic role of actual causation under the negligence rule); Kahan, supra
note 32, at 429, 432 (analyzing "the incentives to take care that are created under the
negligence rule").
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Shavell's groundbreaking contribution focuses, for the most part,
on simple cases when one party causes harm to another. Shavell
did, however, address situations like Summers, where it was clear
that one careless party injured the victim but the other did not. 34
He explains that in Summers "neither hunter could be said to be a
cause in fact of the injury," but he nevertheless justifies the
imposition of liability on economic grounds. 35 If the court did not
impose liability on both, he argues, the result would be to
"inappropriately weaken the incentive of the injurers to avoid [the]
harm," because it would mean that, from the hunters' perspective,
engaging in the activity is costless. 36 Shavell expresses a similar
concern in his seminal book on accident law with regard to
concurrent causes cases.3 7 Judge Posner echoes the same view in
his treatise. 38 After discussing a case in which hunters, A and B,
both carelessly shot and hit C, he explains that "viewed separately,
neither A nor B caused C's death." 3 9 Yet, despite the lack of actual
causation, he concludes that "it would be an economic mistake to let
both off scot-free, as that would reduce deterrence." 40
As the drag racing example reveals, imposing liability on
multiple actors can also dilute the parties' incentives to avoid the
harm-even to the point that no one would take care. However,
It could be
the result is not necessarily inappropriate.
economically sound. In the drag racing example, if liability were
imposed only on the driver who injured the victim, a welfareenhancing accident would not take place. 41 The injuring driver

3 Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of
Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 494 (1980).

a5 Id.
36

Id.

37 SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 164-67.

Shavell analyzes the effect of different liability
regimes on parties' incentives to take care. Relying on a concurrent cause example
involving two polluting factories, he concludes that if liability of each factory is diluted
"injurers may not be led to take adequate care if they act independently." Id. at 164. He
then warns that "the problem of inadequate incentives ... could be substantial where the
number of injurers is large" and that the problem will increase with the number of injurers.
Id. at 166. Shavell is correct that, with more actors, the liability of each would be diluted
further. He is also correct that, as a result of the dilution, the parties may decline to take
care. However, what he misses is that forgoing care could be economically justified. For an
illustration see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
3 POSNER, supra note 11, at 212-13.
39 Id. at 212.
40 Id.
41 See supra notes 20, 25.
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would take care and avoid the harm.4 2 On the other hand, if the
injuring driver shares liability with two non-injuring participants,
neither will take care, nor should they. Taking care is not costjustified. The parties would need to spend an aggregate amount of
$105 (35x3) to avoid a $90 expected harm. Moreover, the activity,
if conducted carelessly, increases total welfare. It yields $120
(40x3) in benefits compared to a $90 harm, thus producing an
expected surplus of $30 (120-90). Example 1 above and Part IV.A
below also reveal that the claim that "neither [actor] could be said
to be a cause in fact of the injury"43 is incorrect. Each of the noninjuring actors is (or for policy reasons should be considered)
equally responsible for the harm. In the above example, but-for
each and every one of the actors, the tortious activity would not
have occurred and the victim would not be harmed. Each actor's
behavior is thus an actual (but-for) cause of the harm.
Scholars and courts analyzing multiple causation situations
often rely on Shavell's insights.4 4 They explain that imposing
liability on those who acted wrongfully toward the victim (but did
not harm her) is necessary to increase deterrence. Consider, for
example,

Fischer's

analysiS 4 5

of Tidal Oil

Co.

v.

Pease-a

42 See infra Section VI (discussing the possible results of applying the one-party-pays-all
rule).
4 Shavell, supra note 34, at 494 (discussing the role of the actual causation in cases
involving multiple injurers and explaining that in situations like Summers the "requirement
of causation in fact is relaxed"); see also Posner, supra note 11, at 212 (arguing that when two
hunters, A and B, both fatally and carelessly shot C, neither A nor B separately caused C's
death and explaining that "the analysis is the same if only one bullet hits C and we do not
know whether A or B fired it"); supranotes 34-40 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 KY. L.J. 277, 295 (2005) (explaining
that in cases involving multiple tortfeasors, where the action of neither is necessary nor
sufficient to alone cause the harm, "[1]iability promotes deterrence by giving each tortfeasor
an incentive to avoid making it a contribution to injury"); David M. Schultz, Market Share
Liability in DES Cases: The UnwarrantedErosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REV.
771, 779 (1991) (noting the competing concerns of "compensating victims" and avoiding
"excessive liability"); see also Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 329 (Ill. 1990) (citing
Fischer, supra note 10, at 1628-29) ("The identification element of causation in fact serves
an important function in tort law. Besides assigning blame-worthiness to culpable parties,
it also limits the scope of potential liability and thereby encourages useful activity that
would otherwise be deterred if there were excessive exposure to liability."); Eberhard Feess
& Ulrich Hege, Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard, 154

J.

INSTITUTIONAL

& THEORETICAL

ECON.

422,

425

(1998)

(arguing that

"if each

injurer ... pays only a fraction of the total harm, then care levels will be inefficiently low
since each injurer will only take a part of the total harm into consideration").
45 Fischer, supra note 44, at 295 (arguing that "[tihe rationale for liability is strongest in
cases like Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease").
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concurrent causes situation similar to the two-fires hypothetical. 46
In Tidal Oil, the plaintiffs cattle died after drinking from two
streams, each polluted by a different group of defendants. 47 There
was no evidence that any polluter alone could have caused the
damage. Yet, the court held all defendants liable. It explained
that, where the defendants' independent acts combine to produce
an indivisible harm, each is responsible for the entire result "even
though the act of any one defendant might not have caused it."48
Fischer justifies the holding based on, among other things,
economic theory:
The rationale for liability is strongest in cases like Tidal
Oil Co. v. Pease. . . . Liability promotes deterrence by
giving each tortfeasor an incentive to avoid making a
contribution to injury.
Economic theory supports
liability because the only way to prevent the accident is
to deter a sufficient number of tortfeasors from acting.
This is a "simultaneous joint tort" where a fixed level of
care by all (or most) of the tortfeasors is required to
prevent the injury and harm. 49
Fischer is incorrect for a number of reasons. To begin with,
Tidal Oil is not necessarily a case where each or most tortfeasors
must take care to avoid the harm. For example, assume that the
pollutants of nine out of ten operating factories must combine to
cause the victim's harm. Assume also that taking care costs each
factory $35. Here, requiring all actors to take care at a total cost
of $350 (35x10) does not make any sense. The same accident can
be avoided if two factories take care at a total cost of $70 (35x2).
Second, and more importantly, the conclusion that imposing
liability on a large number of actors "promotes deterrence"5 0 and is
the "only way to prevent the accident"5 1 is faulty. If anything,
46 Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 5 P.2d 389, 391 (Okla. 1931) (noting neither polluter alone could
have caused the harm but the polluters' combined power proved deadly for plaintiffs
livestock); see also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dexter, 57 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Okla. 1936);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, cmt. i, illus. 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (basing
illustration on Tidal Oil).
47 Tidal Oil Co., 5 P.2d at 390-91.
48 Id. at 391.
49 Fischer, supra note 44, at 295 (emphasis added).
50 Id.
51 Id.
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imposing liability on a large number of defendants could dilute
their incentives to take care and could result in more (not fewer)
accidents. 52
If deterrence is the "strongest"53 rationale for
imposing liability in cases like Tidal Oil, it is a very poor rationale.
Finally, as Part III below explains, and the drag race example
implies, the rationale for imposing liability is the opposite. It is to
allow welfare-enhancing accidents. For example, if the harm to
the victim is $40, and each of the ten factories above benefits $50
from the activity, the activity is efficient (50x10>40). And not even
one factory should take care (35x2>40), nor would it (40/10<35).
This Article further shows that the conventional wisdom, stated
by Shavell, does not hold in the three paradigmatic cases.
According to this wisdom, too much liability results in suboptimal
activity levels, whereas too little liability results in suboptimal
precaution levels. 54 However, things are different in the multiple
causes situations discussed here. Part III below shows that by
imposing liability on those who did not injure the victim-what the
literature views as "excessive liability" 5 5-the
law encourages
welfare-enhancing activities; by imposing "too little" liability on
those who injured the victim (but can expect to pay a fraction
thereof), the law encourages actors to take the optimal level of care.
III. A NEW RATIONALE: ENCOURAGING WELFARE ENHANCING
ACCIDENTS
A. DILUTION OF LIABILITY CAN RESULT IN OPTIMAL PRECAUTION
LEVELS

Dilution of liability, a phenomenon I discussed elsewhere, 56
provides another explanation for group causation theories like the
one applied in Summers.57 In these cases, courts first determine
which defendants acted tortiously towards the victim (i.e., whether
See supra Part III; supra pp. 5-6.
Fischer, supra note 44, at 295.
SHAVELL, supra note 11; supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 44, at 779 (noting tort law's need to avoid imposing
"excessive liability").
56 Dillbary, supra note 24, at 965.
57 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions adopted some version of Summers v. Tice.
52

53
54

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

28(b)

reporters' note, cmt. f ("Only two jurisdictions have rejected the concept of alternative
liability since the Second Restatement.").
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there was careless shooting, the encouragement of reckless driving,
or the unreasonable setting of a fire). Courts then apply a group
causation theory to establish a causal link between each of the
tortious actors-those who injured the victim and those who did not
(e.g., the hunter who did not injure Summers, the spectator in a
drag race who clearly did not injure the victim, and the polluters in
Tidal Oil who may not have contributed to the victim's damage).
The result of holding all tortious actors liable is a dilution of each
actor's liability. The actor who injured the victim can expect to pay
less than the harm she inflicted. The non-injuring yet tortious
actors can expect to pay a fraction of the damages stemming from
an injury they clearly did not inflict. By imposing liability on all
tortious actors and then diluting each actor's liability, the law
encourages actors to engage in the activities and take precautions if
they are cost-justified, and forgo taking care if it is socially
undesirable to do so. In other words, concerted action and other
group causation theories serve as a sorting mechanism. They are
designed to deter actors from engaging in "bad," or welfare
decreasing, accidents, but they encourage them to engage in "good,"
or welfare enhancing, accidents.
To understand the role dilution of liability plays in alternative
liability cases, reconsider Example 1 above 8-with one exception.
To illustrate how similar the causation theories are, assume that,
instead of drivers in a drag race, the participants are hunters. For
convenience, the example (as applied to hunters) is reproduced
below:
Example 1: Hunting. A number of actors consider
whether to hunt. Each can estimate her own benefit
from the activity but not that of others. The benefit
can be tangible (e.g., the market value of the game) or
intangible (e.g., the pleasure from hunting).
Each
participant expects to benefit $40 from the activity.
The expected harm to the victim is $90. Each hunter
can avoid harming the victim if she invests $35 in
precaution.

58

See supra p. 5.
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A hunter should and will take care if she is the only one
hunting. Taking care allows the hunter to avoid an expected
judgment of $90 at a low cost of $35, and even expect a profit
The result does not change if two are hunting
(40>35).
concurrently. Total benefits from taking precaution outweigh the
costs (90>35x2), and each enjoys an expected gain of $5 (40-35).
But in the case of three hunters, taking precaution is not costjustified. Requiring each hunter to take care results in a total cost
of $105 (35x3), only to prevent a $90 damage to the victim. As
Table 1 below demonstrates, taking care becomes more and more
costly and socially undesirable as the number of hunters increases.
With five hunters, taking care comes at a cost of $175 (35x5),
almost twice the cost of the injury ($90). If, on the other hand, the
actors do not take care, social welfare more than quadruples
(increasing from $25 to $110).59
Number
of
Hunters

Total
Benefits
TB=40h

With Precaution
Total
Total Cost
Welfare
TC=35h
TB-TC"

Without Precaution
Total
Indiv.
Indiv.
Welfare
Net Gain
Exp. Liab.
TB-90u
40-90/h
90/hel

h
01
2
3
4
5

40
80
120
160
200

35
70
105
140
175

5
10
15
20
2

90
45
30
22.5
18

-50
-5
10
17.5
22

-50
-10
30
70
110

Table 1: The Expected Costs and Benefits from Hunting With and
Without Precautions

i9 If each of the five hunters takes care, each can expect to profit $5 (40-35), resulting in a
total expected increase in welfare of $25 (5x5). If on the other hand, none take care, each
hunter can expect to benefit $40 and the harm to the victim is expected to be $90, resulting
in total expected increase in welfare of $110 (5x40-90).
6o When precautions are taken, the potential victim is not damaged and each hunter can
expect a net profit of $5 (40-35). The expected increase in total welfare is thus equal to $5h,
where h is the number of hunters. It can also be calculated as the sum of expected benefits,
40h, minus the total expected cost of precaution, 35h, or 40h-35h.
61 With h careless hunters, the expected liability of each is 1/h(90) or 90/h. For example,
with three such hunters, each can expect to pay one-third of the damage, or $30 (90/3).
62 Without precaution, the total expected cost is the $90 expected harm to the victim.
The expected change in total welfare is thus the sum of the expected benefits to the
wrongdoers, 40h, minus the expected cost, $90, or 40h-90.
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The conclusion is that efficiency requires that, when three or
more hunters engage in the activity, none take care. Why then
does alternative liability hold all hunters liable-those who
injured the victim and those who did not? The reason is not
deterrence per se, nor is it moral disdain towards the actors'
behavior.6 3 In fact, the opposite is true. Liability is imposed on all
actors in order to dilute their incentives to take care and allow them
to engage in socially desirable accidents. Put differently, doctrines
like alternative liability, which hold all tortious actors liable for
the victim's injury, may be the very reason the parties in a large
enough group do not take care. The reason for imposing liability
in these situations is the courts' inability to distinguish between
welfare decreasing and welfare maximizing accidents.
The
problem is that determining the exact moment where taking
precaution becomes inefficient (here, when the number of actors is
three or higher) is a daunting, if not an impossible, task. A court
that would like to conduct the cost-benefit analysis would need to
measure and compare the subjective benefits that each of the
several actors garner from the activity and compare these
subjective benefits to the cost of precaution and the victim's
expected injury. Courts rarely have such information. Even if the
cost of precaution can be calculated, the subjective value of
hunting to each individual hunter is not usually observable.
The solution is to defer to the market participants-that is, the
actors-the decision as to whether to engage in an activity and
whether to take care. To do so, courts first determine whether the
actors were liable. The analysis is individual. Here, ignoring for a
moment the others, each actor had a duty to the victim that she
breached because taking care was cost-justified (35<90).64 This is
the working of the celebrated Learned Hand formula.6 5 Then, in
the second step, courts use a group causation doctrine such as
63 For a different view, see Fischer, supra note 10, at 1629-30, 1632 (arguing that
alternative liability expresses "moral blame" and explaining that in Summers "[c]ulpabilitybased blame was present because each defendant's conduct was unquestionably of an
antisocial nature"); Malone, supra note 8, at 84 (noting that moral blameworthiness was a
factor in Summers because "both defendants were shown to be wrongdoers" who had "violated
one of the most exacting rules that courts . .. administer").
64 This is so despite the fact that, taking under consideration all actors' payoffs, the
activity may be net beneficial. See Dillbary, supra note 24, at 975 n.68, 1001 n.129
(explaining that liability may be imposed on actors "although the total benefit from the
activity outweighs the loss"); infra note 110.
65 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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alternative liability to hold each of the hunters liable for the entire
harm. The effect of imposing liability on a number of actors,
including those who clearly did not injure the victim, is an
effective dilution mechanism. It encourages the hunters to take
care when doing so is cost-justified. In our example, one hunter
will take care, which is the socially desirable result (35<90). The
same will happen with two hunters. Each hunter can expect a
benefit of $5 (40-35) if she takes care, but a loss of $5 (40-90/2) if
both act carelessly, or $50 (40-90) if she acts carelessly when the
other takes care. With three hunters none would want to take
care, since the expected liability of each is diluted by the
alternative liability doctrine to 90/3, or $30. In such a case, the
hunters are better off if they all forgo taking care. Acting careless
in unison comes with an expected benefit of $10 (40-90/3). Acting
carefully promises half of the gain: $5 (40-35).
To sum, the example reveals that the concern that the injurer
will be subject to "too little" liability is overly broad. "Too little"
liability can indeed result in less investment in precaution, but the
result may be optimal. Forgoing care can increase total welfare.
The next section focuses on the impact of group causation theories
on activity levels.
B. DILUTION OF LIABILITY CAN RESULT IN OPTIMAL ACTIVITY LEVELS

In deviation from the prior literature, which argues that
imposing liability on those who did not injure the victim can result
in over-deterrence in the form of sub-optimal activity levels, this
Section shows that the opposite could also be true. Holding liable
non-injuring actors can achieve optimal activity levels. To explain
this point, reconsider Example 1,66 with the only exception being
that now the cost of precaution is higher: $60 (rather than $35).
For convenience, the modified example is reprinted below:
Example IB: Hunting. A number of actors consider
whether to hunt. Each expects a $40 benefit. The
expected harm to the victim is $90. Each actor can
avoid harming the victim if she invests $60 in
precaution.

66

See supra p. 5.
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Here, unlike before, hunting is welfare decreasing if conducted
by one or two hunters. With one hunter, the activity confers a
benefit of $40, but inflicts an expected damage of $90. Taking
precaution does not make sense either because the cost of
precaution outweighs the benefit from hunting (40<60). The result
does not change if two hunters engage in the activity (40+40<60x2,
90). In both cases, it is best if the actors avoid the activity
altogether. But with three hunters, a harmful activity that was
inefficient if conducted by one or two becomes socially desirable.
With three hunters, the benefits from engaging in the harmful
activity outweigh the expected cost to the victim (40x3>90) and
efficiency requires that none take care (60x3>90).
As I showed elsewhere, a liability rule combined with a dilution
mechanism can result in welfare-increasing accidents by deferring
the decision of whether to act and take care to market actors. 6 7
This is exactly what group causation theories like alternative
liability do. In the above example, it will incentivize two actors (by
subjecting them to liability) to avoid hunting (40<60, 90/2). But, it
encourages group wrongdoing if three (or more) actors hunt. By
holding each liable for the entire $90 harm but diluting the
hunters' individual liability to $30 (90/3), alternative liability
makes it worthwhile for each to engage in the activity and forgo
taking care. The result is that, if the three act in unison, each
actor can obtain a gain of $10 (40-90/3).68
C. RESPECTING INJURERS' SUBJECTIVE VALUATIONS

Courts are aware of the fact that many activities come with
social benefits that justify the harm to the victim. 6 9 Indeed, the
67

Dillbary, supra note 24, at 954.

68 The same dynamic occurs in concurrent causes cases. Suppose, for example, that in

Examples 1 and 1B, the parties are not hunters or drivers, but are instead campers.
Assume further that, like the hunting example discussed in Section III.A, each camper
alone can cause the $90 expected harm to the victim. Assume also that each camper values
the activity at $40. The analysis would be identical to that in Section III.A if each camper
can take care at a cost of $35; the analysis would be identical to that in Section III.B if each
can take care at a cost of $60. In either case, the incentives of the campers to take care will
be reduced, their incentives to engage in a potentially harmful activity will increase, and
the benefits from doing so will increase more and more as others join the activity.
69 See Lennon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 504 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing
a
game of Russian roulette and explaining that "at some point the high likelihood of risk and
the extensive degree of harm risked, weigh[s] against the lack of social utility of the
activity"); infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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Hand formula itself is a recognition of this social policy. For this
reason, courts do not prohibit such risky activities. Instead, they
hold liable the tortious actors. The imposition of liability ensures
that the act produces more social benefits than harms. The
following example is illustrative:
Example 2: Polluting Factories. A number of
factories are located next to the plaintiffs property.
None of the factories alone can destroy the plaintiffs
property. Only if three or more factories operate
without care will the plaintiffs property be harmed
and destroyed. The value of the plaintiffs property is
$90. Each factory expects to benefit $20 from the
activity. Taking care is impossible (or too costly).
Here, producing and polluting is beneficial if at least five
factories engage in the activity (20x5>90). A liability rule aided
with a causation theory like the substantial factor doctrine can
achieve this result. One, two, three, or even four factories will not
engage in the activity because the expected liability of each (90,
90/2, 90/3, 90/4, respectively) will outweigh the $20 private benefit.
But five factories will be better off if they all engage in the activity
because each can expect a profit of $2 (20-90/5). In cases like Tidal
Oil, courts justify the activity (even if indirectly so). They hold the
actors liable, but aware of the large benefits that these activities
entail, they refuse to issue injunctions that would bring them to a
halt. 70 After all, in a pristine, pollution-free world, one could not
drive cars, construct roads, or produce electricity.
But not all activities are equal, or so we are told. Many
activities do not provide what judges and policymakers often term
as social benefits.71 In fact, in all of the three paradigmatic cases,
70 See Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 167 F. 342, 364-72 (C.C.D. Mont. 1909)
(denying injunction after finding that the damage therefrom to the defendants' operation
and the state of Montana would greatly exceed the damage to the plaintiff); Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666-67 (Tenn. 1904) (refusing "to
protect by injunction [owners of] several small tracts of land, aggregating in value less than
$1,000" by explaining that an injunction halting the defendants' operation would "destroy
other property worth nearly $2,000,000 and wreck two great mining and manufacturing
enterprises, that are engaged in work of very great importance, not only to their owners,
but to the state, and to the whole country as well. . . ").
71 Some economists have taken a similar view. See, e.g., MICELI, supra note 32, at 75
(noting that "in some cases the benefit to the injurer of inflicting harm may exceed the cost
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one can point to cases where the actors attach subjective
valuations to activities that benefit only them, harm innocent
third parties, and are frowned upon by society. Summers is a
borderline case. The actors in Summers may have valued the
activity because of the market value of the game, or because of the
pure enjoyment from shooting and the act of hunting. Despite the
obvious tangible and intangible benefits associated with shooting,
courts have often treated shooting cases as involving a unique
class of unappreciated activities.7 2 Unlike in Summers, in many
alternative liability cases the value of the risky activity to the
actors could be wholly intangible and, at least outwardly, socially
unappreciated. Horseplay (e.g., when actors throw erasers at each
other) and paintball games 7 3 are examples of risky activities that
confer intangible benefits-the subjective hedonic feeling
generated by the game-upon the actors but no one else.74

So is

the case with the campers who can enjoy the comfort of their
homes, but prefer the enjoyment of the outdoors and the warmth
of a campfire in a densely wooded area. And, in a drag race, it is
likely the illegal activity, the speeding or gambling, and perhaps
the possibility of harming others, which generate the pleasuring
effect.7 5 In all of these cases, the participants engage in activities
which society, at least outwardly, disapproves and which may hurt
innocent third parties.7 6

to the victim, but the benefit is not socially valuable"); Guido Calabresi, Lecture at the
Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economic Association, in Of Tastes and Values,
YALE LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 500, at 6-7, 22 (Aug. 2014), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2483947 (challenging the Becker-Stigler view that the economist cannot say much
about the relative merits of values and tastes; arguing that, as a society we care about
certain values more than others, and that identifying these fundamental values is not only
possible, but also critical for lawmaking).
72 See Malone, supra note 8, at 84 (explaining how "the law has always dealt strictly with
accidental shootings"); supranote 63 and infra note 106 and accompanying text.
73 For examples where innocent parties were injured in horseplay and paintball games,
see, respectively, infra notes 85, 124, and accompanying text.
7 One may argue that such games provide some tangible benefits, such as survival and
shooting skills. Note. also that there may be a market price for activities that confer
intangible benefits to their participants, as with paintball facilities where one is required to
pay a fee for the right to participate in the game.
75 Of course some actors, like the winner, may also receive a tangible benefit
(e.g., a
prize).
76

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 28(b)

cmt. n, illus. 12 (discussing a paintball game conducted in a secluded area in which
the participants injure a faultless victim).
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What courts have failed to understand (or admit) is that they
respect the subjective values that actors place on activities that
harm others-the very subjective values that the same courts
denounce as immoral and antisocial. Consider again a drag racethe classic case of a "concerted action" situation. Premised on the
criminal concept of aiding and abetting, the theory of concerted
action imposes liability not only on those who pursue a common
plan to commit a tortious act, but also on those who furthered the
tortious act by encouraging the wrongdoers.7 7 The pronounced
purpose of the doctrine is to satisfy the actual causation element in
situations where it is clear that some of the defendants did not
injure the victim (e.g., a spectator),78 or in situations where the
plaintiff cannot identify the injurer (e.g., if it is not clear which of
the drivers injured the victim).7 9

The reasons for imposing

liability-as with the other group causation theories discussed
here-are fairness to the victim and the societal distaste for the
defendants' behavior. "[C]oncerted action . .. express[es] moral
condemnation for the actions of all of the defendants, refusing to
let the individuals escape from liability by claiming that their

77 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 46, at 323 (explaining that "the rule goes back
to the early days when the action of trespass was primarily a criminal action" and that
under the rule "those who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer ... are equally
liable").
78 See, e.g., Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ("Under
the concert of action theory, a person may be held liable for concerted activity which causes
injury to another, though that person was not the cause in fact of the injury."); Ogle v.
Avina, 146 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1966) ("In a race, the participants share equally the
responsibility for damage done by any participant."); Sanke v. Bechina, 576 N.E.2d 1212,
1218 (1991) (a passenger who encourages a driver to drive carelessly may be held liable);
Cooper v. Bondoni, 841 P.2d 608, 611-12 (1992) ("[A] person may be subject to liability for
the resulting harm to a third person caused by the tortious conduct of another, when the
non-acting person knows that the tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and he
aids its commission by giving substantial assistance or encouragement to the tortfeasor.");
Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 3192 (1985) ("Even if
defendant caused no harm himself, he is liable for the harm caused by his fellows because
all acted jointly."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) cmt. d CAdvice or
encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged
is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as
participation or physical assistance."); David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in
Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1781-82 (1997) ("The concert-of-action approach was used to
solve the cause-in-fact problem. . . .").
79 See, e.g.,.Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (citing
Orser v. George, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)) (explaining that "the rationale of
the use of that theory [is] to satisfy the element of causation in a situation where a plaintiff
cannot identify the culpable defendant"), vacated, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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participation in the tort was less than that of the other defendants
or that they did not themselves cause the plaintiffs injury." 0 Its
"purpose .

.

. is .

.

. to deter anti-social behavior."8 1

Yet despite its benevolent goals-condemning what are framed
as immoral acts and promoting fairness to victims-group
causation theories like concerted action may incentivize the very
acts they purport to condemn and deter. To explain how, consider
a case in which, unlike Example 2 (polluting factories), the
benefits to the parties would not be considered acceptable. For
example, assume that in a drag race it is the illegality of the
activity or the possibility of harming one that generates the value
to the parties. The example is summarized below:
Example
IC: The Benefits from Driving
Tortiously. A number of actors consider whether to
engage in a drag race. Each expects a $40 benefit
provided the activity is tortious. The expected harm is
$90.82

Here, a drag race with two drivers is clearly undesirable. It
brings a total benefit of $80 (40x2), but it inflicts an expected cost
of $90.
Concerted action seems initially to align the actors'
incentives with society's. Neither driver will engage in the activity
because her private benefit, $40, is outweighed by the expected
liability of $45 (90/2). But, suppose the party consists of three
individuals (for example, two drivers and a spectator). Now the
law of actual causation makes an illegal, condemned activity
worthwhile.
Because concerted action theory holds everyone
80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.

§

15 reporters' note, cmt. a

(AM. LAW INST. 2000) (emphasis added); see also Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221
(Del. 1968) (holding that it could be inferred from the circumstances that the defendants
had agreed to engage in a car race, an activity prohibited by law in many states); Hood v.
Evans, 126 S.E.2d 898, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (imposing liability on a non-driver who had
signaled the start of the race); Hanrahan v. Cochran, 12 A.D. 91, 94-95 (N.Y. App. Div.
1896) (noting that the horse racing in a crowded street was a criminal act and holding a
defendant who "did not actually" injure the victim liable).
81 Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
See also Abel v. Eli Lily & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 n.19 (Mich. 1984) (noting that
concerted action "seems to have developed to deter hazardous group behavior").
82 Example iC is identical to Example 1B in that, in both, taking care is not an option.
The difference is that in Example 1B the cost of taking care, $60, outweighed the benefit
from taking care, $40; in Example 1C taking care will render the activity valueless (i.e., the
activity will be so dull as to confer no benefits upon the participants).
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(drivers and spectators) liable in case of an injury, if all partake in
the activity, each will have an expected liability of $30 (90/3) and
can thus expect a net gain (40>30).
What some may find surprising is that, despite lip service to the
contrary, the law prefers the actors' subjective enjoyment from
engaging in a condemned activity over the victim's interest in
being free from harm. In that sense, group causation theories like
concerted action fit well within the traditional tort framework.
They provide wrongdoers with a license to harm so long as the
subjective benefits to the injurers from harming outweigh the
damage to the victim. The price of the "license" (in the form of the
expected judgment) can be quite cheap: $30 (90/3) in the above
example. And, the more actors that engage in the activity, the
cheaper the license to harm becomes.
Courts and scholars seem to have missed this point. Consider,
for example, the following excerpt from Judge Posner's decision in
Boim, a case decided under the Anti-Terrorist Act, but according to
tort law principles:
As we explained in United States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d
875, 877 (7th Cir. 2007) [a criminal case], "firing
multiple shots from a powerful gun ... in the
downtown of a large city at a time when
pedestrians ... are known to be in the vicinity creates
a risk of harm that, while not large in probabilistic
terms, is 'substantial' relative to the gratuitousness of
the defendant's actions... . An activity is reckless
when the potential harm that it creates .. . is wildly
disproportionate to any benefits that the activity might
be expected to confer.... The emotional gratification
that defendant Boyd derived from shooting into the
night, though perhaps great, is not the kind of benefit
that has weight in the scales when on the other side is
danger to life and limb, even if the danger is limited, as
it was here."8 3

83 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding,
en banc, that financial contribution to a terrorist group constitutes an act of terrorism
under the Anti-Terrorist Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1), 2333 (2012)) (second emphasis added).
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The claim that the "emotional gratification" of the defendant is
not a benefit that the law considers in the scales of justice may be
true in the criminal justice system where liability is not diluted.
Indeed, if two actors shoot recklessly and hit a third, in many
jurisdictions each will be subject to the same penalty regardless of
whether she was the actual shooter. Of course, the parties may
still elect to engage in the activity if they believe that the benefit
from the criminal act outweighs the expected cost, but their
criminal liability is not diluted because other criminals join
them. 84 It is also true that in tort cases, courts ignore such private
benefits when they determine, using the Learned Hand formula,
whether an actor breached her duty to the defendant. Tort law,
however, does not ignore the actors' subjective pleasure from
harming another. Keel v. Hainline is illustrative.8 5 In Keel, forty
junior high school students showed up for class but their instructor
did not. While waiting for the instructor, some of the students
engaged in what they termed "horse play." This included throwing
chalk, wooden blackboard erasers, and other instruments at each
other. The activity took place for thirty minutes until one of the
students who did not participate in the fight was injured in her eye
by an eraser thrown by Jennings. There was no ill intent. The
court found that the students merely intended to strike each other
"in sport" and "without intent to [injure]." 86 Relying on concerted
action theory, the court held liable all those who participated in

84 In fact, crimes like felony murder may even increase the actors' individual liability as
others join the group. For example, if A decides to rob a bank she will be criminally liable
for robbery. Assume now that A, the original robber, decides to get some help and rob
together with a fellow criminal. If A's associate, unbeknownst to her and even against her
explicit will and instructions, kills someone during the robbery, even accidently, A, the nonshooting robber, may be held criminally liable for felony murder as well as robbery. In
contrast, in tort cases, even if the total expected liability increases with the number of
tortfeasors, the individual liability is nevertheless a function of D/n (where D is the total
expected harm and n is the number of tortfeasors) and may thus decline. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d, illus. 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (when "A and
B conspire to burglarize C's safe" and B, "without A's knowledge of his intention to do so,
burns the house in order to conceal the burglary," both A and B are liable for the conversion
of the contents as well as the destruction of the house).
85 Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958).
86 Id. at 399.
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the horseplay.8 7 This included Keel, who did not throw anything
but only retrieved erasers and handed them to others. 8
Holding defendants like Keel-who clearly did not injure the
victim-liable is unlikely to deter actors from taking part in such
unappreciated "pastime" activities.8 9 If each participant values
the horseplay at $40, and the expected damage is $90,
participating in the game is worthwhile so long as there are at
least three participants (40>90/3). The game is more enjoyable
(and thus more enticing) as the number of participants increases.
While with three participants each enjoys a net value of $10 (4090/3), with ten participants the enjoyment more than triples to $31
(40-90/10). Keel and other concerted action cases are examples of
how the law respects private valuation of parties engaging in
activities it ostensibly holds to be unacceptable or immoral.
Boim exemplifies even further what some may consider a
perverse outcome of group causation theories like concerted
action.9 0 The plaintiffs in Boim were the parents of a Jewish
teenager killed in a terror attack in Israel by Hamas terrorists.
The suit, brought against Islamic charities, claimed that their
financial support to Hamas constituted an act of terrorism under
the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). In an en banc opinion written by
Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. It
held that the plaintiff only has to show that (a) the defendant
provided material support; (b) to a terrorist organization; (c)
knowing (or with recklessness or indifference as to the fact) that
the ultimate recipient carries out violence. 91
Importantly, relying on tort law's concerted action theory, 92 the
court found the plaintiff does not have to show a causal link
between the contribution and the activities of the terror
organization. 93 The court explained that civil "suits against

Id. at 400.
88 Id. ("Keel aided and abetted the wrongful throwing by procuring and supplying to the
throwers the articles to be thrown.").
89 Id. at 399 (explaining that horseplay is not "an innocent and lawful pastime, even
though done in sport and without intent to injure" and holding that "[s]uch conduct is
wrongful").
90 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2008).
91 Id. at 693-94.
[to] analyze the tort liability of providers of
92 Id. at 692 ("[P]rudence counsels us ...
material support to terrorism under general principles of tort law.").
93 Id. at 697.
87

2016]

CAUSATIONACTUALLY

29

financiers of terrorism can cut the terrorists' lifeline"94 and serve
"as a counterterrorism measure." 95 The belief that concerted
action theory can deter financiers of terrorism by imposing on
them civil liability is overly optimistic. By now you should be able
to see that it may actually encourage terrorism supported by a
large base, a "terror-fest." Assume each financier values the
terrorist organization's harmful activities at $200,000 (measured
by the maximum amount she is willing and able to donate) and
that the expected loss to American citizens located in the
terrorists' area of operation (Israel in the case of Boim) as a result
of the group's operations is $10 million. Concerted action theory
only means that, if more than fifty entities contribute to the terrorgroup, then contributing, at least in the eyes of the donors, is
It also means that the net
worthwhile (200,000>10M/51).
subjective benefits from contributing (in the form of allowing the
terrorists to further their goals) increase with the number of
contributors. For example, with 100 contributors, the expected
liability of each is only $100,000 (10M/100), which means that for
those making contributions, contributing was ultimately
worthwhile.
Imposing liability for such acts is necessary, but it is important
to understand that it may not be enough given the dilution. The
ATA, it should be noted, imposes automatic treble damages.9 6
Punitive damages can indeed deter. But, punitive damages have a
limited effect.97 In the above example, treble damages may not
deter those who are willing to support terror-groups if the number
of contributors is larger than 150 (200,000>3x1OM/151), or if each
contributor values the terrorists' harmful activity more than
$600,000 (600,001>3xlOM/50). The ATA's imposition of punitive
damage is a move in the right direction. Punitive damages serve
as an anti-dilution mechanism. 9 8 But to make this mechanism
effective, the law should allow punitive damages to be adjusted
upwards as the number of contributors increases.9 9 Still, the
94 Id. at 691.
95 Id. at 690.
96

Id. at 692.

97 Dillbary, supra note 24, at 978.
98 Id. ("Punitive damages, if set high enough, would serve as an effective anti-dilution
mechanism ... ).
99 Id. Of course, the effectiveness of punitive (or any) damages is also dependent on the
ability of the defendant to pay such damages.
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defendants in Boim may be deterred from donating to a terror
organization because of the criminal liability imposed upon them.
But, if criminal liability does not produce the desired effect, civil
liability may reinforce the deterrence effect if it is not overly
diluted.
IV. CAUSATION ACTUALLY
A. CAUSATION ACTUALLY AND THE BUT-FOR TEST

The theory pressed in this Article also reveals that courts and
scholars have been too quick to concede that actual causation is
"relaxed" or abandoned in the three paradigmatic cases.
In
deviation from the prior literature, this Article argues that in many
of these cases the conduct of each of the non-injuring actors was
either the actual cause of the victim's harm or, for policy reasons,
should be treated as such.
The main test for determining whether the defendant's conduct
was the actual cause of the victim's harm is the but-for (or sine
qua non) test.100 It asks whether the harm would not have
occurred but for the defendant's misconduct. 101 The test implies
that the defendant's tortious conduct is a necessary condition for
the harm. 102 Courts and scholars have long concluded that the
but-for test fails miserably in situations involving multiple
actors. 103 The claim is that neither the spectator in a drag race,
nor the campers who carelessly set the merging fires, nor the
shooter who did not injure Summers, were necessary for the
victim's harm.
The harm, it is argued, would have occurred
regardless of whether these actors engaged in the activity. In
other words, in each of these cases, the victim's fate was already
determined with or without the acts of these defendants-or at

100 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10,

§

§ 41,

at 266.

101

Id.

102

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

26 cmt. b ("[A] factual cause can also be described as a necessary condition for the
outcome."); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 265 ("An act or an omission is not
regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it.").
103 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 266 (arguing that the but-for
test "fails" when multiple sufficient forces concur to bring about the harm); MICELI, supra
note 32, at 40 (describing the difficulties presented when applying the but-for test in cases
with multiple causes); See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
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least that is how courts and scholars approach the issue.10 4 This
widely accepted description is faulty.
1. A Non-Injurer Actor Can Be a But-For Reason for the Harm.
To begin with, in some cases the harm would not have occurred
but for the participation of those who did not actually injure the
victim. To see this, consider the following alternative liability
example-a modified version of Example 1B105 above:

Example 1D: Alternative Liability (Hunting). A
and B consider whether to hunt. Each expects a $50
benefit. The expected harm to the victim is $90. The
cost of care is $60.
Neither A nor B would hunt alone. Hunting brings a private
benefit of $50, but would cost $60 if the actor takes care, or $90 if
Hunting together, however, is worthwhile.
she does not.10 6
Because alternative liability dilutes the expected judgment to $45
(90/2), the actors' best-case scenario (and the socially desirable
result 0 7 ) is that neither take care (45<60). In this situation, each

would enjoy a surplus of $5 (50-90/2).
Now assume that the parties acted in their mutual best
interests (i.e., carelessly) and, as a result, A shot and injured the
victim. Although it was A who physically injured the victim, B
was equally at fault. Indeed, but for B's careless participation,A
would not have carelessly engaged in the activity and would not
have injured the victim. In other words, but for the non-injuring
party-here, the party who missed the victim-the victim would
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; infra Section IV.
105 See supra p. 21.
106 This assumes the activity is subject to a liability rule such as strict liability.
See
Malone, supra note 8, at 84 (explaining that "where the misuse of firearms is involved,
courts are willing to hold the defendant [liable] for almost any consequence" and noting that
the "requirement of fault is paid little more than lip service"); see also Wood v. Groh, 7 P.3d
1163, 1168-69 (holding that firearms are inherently dangerous and imposing a higher
standard of care on those having ownership or control of a firearm). For previous examples
showing that a non-injuring party can be a but-for cause of the harm under a negligence
regime, compare supra notes 20-21, 41-43, and accompanying text (discussing Example 1
in the context of a drag race subject to concerted action theory), with notes 60-62 and
accompanying text (discussing Example 1 in a hunting scenario subject to alternative
liability).
107 Assuming one is willing to give weight to the hunters' private benefit, total welfare will
increase by $10 (50x2-90), compared to a welfare loss of $20 (40x2-60) if both hunters take
care and no benefit if the parties avoid the activity altogether.
104
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not have been injured at all. The conclusion is that the conduct of
each hunter is necessary to bring about the harm. Each is an
actual cause of the harm. The conclusion stands in direct contrast
to Posner and Shavell's insight that in Summers "neither hunter
could be said to be a cause in fact of the injury."10 8
2. The Tortious Conduct of Every Actor in a Large Group Is a
But-For Cause of the Harm Even if the Harm Could Be Caused by
a Smaller Group. Sometimes, even absent any one specific actor,
the injurer would have engaged in the harmful activity. One
reason is that even if participation by a small number of actors, m,
is necessary to bring the harm, it could be that the m individuals
will not engage carelessly in the activity unless joined by others.
To illustrate, recall Example 2 10 9-a concurrent cause scenariosummarized below for convenience.
Example 2: Concurrent Causes (Pollution). The
pollution released by each factory is too small to harm
the nearby plaintiffs property. But if three or more
factories operate without care, the plaintiffs property
will be harmed and destroyed.
The value of the
plaintiffs property is $90. Each factory expects to
benefit $20. Taking care is impossible (or too costly).
Three factories could operate, pollute, and destroy the lake, but
they would not do so. This is because, if the three factories
operate, each can expect a net loss of $10 (20-90/3). In fact, no
factory will be willing to operate unless it is part of a group of five
(or more) factories, in which case it can expect a net gain of $2 (2090/5). The result is also socially desirable (20x5>90). Importantly,
each of these five factories is a but-for cause of the harm because the
activity would not take place if only four factories were present.
More formally, the claim is that even if the actions of a minimum
of m actors (here, m=3) are necessary to harm the victim, it is still
necessary that n*>m actors (here n*=5>m=3) participate for the
activity to take place.
3. Heterogeneous Valuations: Cases Where the Injurer Places a
Low Value on the Activity and Would Decline to Engage in the
108 Shavell, supra note 34, at 494; see also POSNER, supra note 11, at 212; supra notes 3840 and accompanying text.
109 See supra p. 22.
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Activity Unless Joined by a Sufficiently Large Group of NonInjurers. Recall Example 2 above but assume now that the parties
are individuals who consider whether to participate in a drag race
(instead of polluting factories).
Example 3: Concerted Action (A Drag Race). Six
actors consider whether to engage in a drag race (as
drivers, passengers or spectators). Five of them, call
them D1-D5, value the careless driving at $20. A
sixth actor, D6, values the activity at $16.
The
expected harm to the victim is $90. Taking care is
impossible. 110
D6 will not join the activity even if she is invited by four of the
other five individuals (D1-D4).111 The expected liability of $18
(90/5) will outweigh her benefits (16<18). But, together with the
other five, drag racing becomes a winning proposition. The reason
is that a group causation doctrine like concerted action will hold
all six actors liable, thereby reducing the expected liability of each
to $15 (90/6).112 Now, D6 can expect a gain (16-15>0). If D6 was
the one who physically harmed the victim, then each of the other
five participants, D1-D5, was also a necessary or but-for cause of
the harm. Indeed, it was only because D1-D5 tortiously engaged in
the activity that D6, the injurer, elected to join the party.
4. No One Specific Actor Seems to Be Necessary for the Harm
but Everyone Is (a But-For Cause) or Reinforces the Decision to
Behave Tortiously. Still, in some cases, it seems that no one actor

110 The activity is tortious if, for example, we assume that it is subject to strict liability.
Liability may be imposed even under a negligence regime. Assume, for example, that the
cost of care is $30. In such a case neither actor will take care (20<30). One may argue that
in the latter case acting carelessly does not constitute a breach of a duty to take care
because the total benefits to the actors outweigh the cost to the victim (20x5+16>90). Still,
a court will likely hold each of the actors liable because of the individual nature of the costbenefit analysis conducted by the court (each factory could have avoided the $90 harm if it
were to invest $30 on precaution). See supra Section III.A; supra note 64. The result will
not change if instead of individuals who consider to participate in drag racing the actors
were campers, each of whom could alone set a fire that would destroy the victim's cabin. In
such a case, substantial factor theory would have the same effect as concerted action theory.
nI Note that with D1-D4 and D6, the activity is net beneficial (20x4+16>90) so,
theoretically, if the parties could, they would enter into a benefit-sharing agreement.
However, a mere invitation would not suffice to entice DG assuming that the actors will be
held liable.
112 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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is the actual cause of the harm, but, in fact, everyone is or-at the
very least-everyone reinforces each actor's decision to partake in
the tortious activity. To see this, consider a variation of the above
example, with one exception: assume that everyone places the
same value on the activity. For convenience, the modified example
is summarized below:
Example 4: No One Actor Seems to Be Necessary
for the Harm. Ten actors consider whether to engage
in a certain tortious activity (e.g., drag racing, careless
camping, or hunting). Each values the activity at $20.
The expected harm to the victim is $90. Taking care is
impossible.
Note first that four actors will not engage in the tortious
activity because each can only expect a loss (20-90/4<0). With five
actors, things change. As part of a group of five actors, each can
expect to pay less: only $18 (90/5) and therefore gain $2 (20-18)
from the careless activity.
But what if six or more actors engaged in the careless activity?
How can it be said that the conduct of each actor in the larger
group, for example ten actors, is a but-for cause of the victim's
harm when only five are necessary to cause each to engage in the
activity that wreaked havoc? Here, it is important to recall that
with each additional actor, each participant can expect a higher
profit. 113 For example, while with five actors each can expect a $2
gain (20-90/5), with six actors the expected gain reaches $5 (2090/6), and with ten actors it reaches $11 (20-90/10). The higher
profit margin does at least two things. First, it reinforces the
decision of each actor to engage in the tortious activity (i.e., to drag
race, pollute, or hunt tortiously). Second, the higher profit margin
incentivizes those who have high opportunity costs to join the
tortious activity. For example, assume that each actor values a
different activity (e.g., sun bathing) at $10.50. Five actors will not
engage in the tortious activity because the competing activity
promises a higher gain (10.50>2). Nor would six, seven, eight, or
nine actors. Only if ten or more actors engage in the tortious
activity will it be profitable enough to convince the parties to forgo

113

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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the competing activity (20-90/10>10.50). In other words, if ten
actors engage in the tortious activity and one (or more) injured the
victim, each of the ten tortious actors is a but-for reason for the

harm.114
Example
1D

2

3

4

Description
But for the tortious behavior of the non-injuring party, the
injuring party would not have engaged tortiously in the activity,
and the victim would not have been harmed.
But for the tortious behavior of each of n actors, the victim
would not have been harmed, although the combined actions of
m (m<n) actors can injure the victim.
But for the tortious behavior of each of the non-injuring parties,
the low value injurer would not have participated tortiously in
the activity, and the victim would not have been harmed.
But for the tortious behavior of each of the non-injuring parties,
the injurer with low opportunity costs would not have engaged
tortiously in the activity, and the victim would not have been
harmed. The increased gain from additional actors reinforces
the parties' decisions.
Table 2: A Summary of Examples 1-4

For all of the reasons discussed in Examples 1-4 (summarized
in Table 2 above), group causation theories treat each actor as if
she were the marginal actor that brought the total number of
actors to the threshold, n*. That is, each actor is treated as if she
was the one that diluted the actual injurer's liability enough to
entice the injuring party to engage in the activity that resulted in
an accident. Thus, although one party physically injured the
victim or her property, all actors caused the victim's injury in the
sense that, but for their tortious individual behaviors, the injury
would not have occurred. The emphasis is on the possibility that
all actors are a but-for cause, because there can be situations
where some of the actors are clearly not necessary to bring about
the harm-this is the subject of the next (and final) example.

114 The extra profit margin also incentivizes risk-averse actors to join the activity.
The
model thus far assumed that actors are risk-neutral. The assumption is reasonable so long
as a vibrant insurance market exists. But if some actors are risk-averse, they may require
a higher rate of return to be persuaded to engage in the risky activity. This will happen if a
large enough number of liable actors join the activity. See also infra Section VI.5.
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5. The Conduct of Neither Actor is a But-For Cause, yet the
Conduct of Every Actor Should Be Presumed to Be the Actual
Cause. Consider the following example.
Example 5: No One Actor Is Necessary for the
Harm. Each of A and B values a certain tortious
activity at $20. The expected harm to the victim is $5.
Taking care is impossible.
Here, each actor would engage in the activity that would give
rise to liability even if she were the only one to do so for an
expected gain of $15 (20-5). Thus, if one of the actors injured the
victim, the injurer alone is a (but-for) cause of the harm. But what
if two actors injured the victim at the same time inflicting an
indivisible harm, as in the case where both tortiously shot and hit
the victim or set fires that merged and destroyed her cabin? No
one actor seems to be necessary for the harm. Indeed, A would
have engaged in the tortious activity regardless of B (20>5). And,
for the same reason, B would have engaged in the activity
regardless of A.
Still, one can argue that in the cases discussed here, each actor
should be presumed to be a but-for cause of the harm. The reason
is based in policy. Courts simply cannot distinguish cases where
the conduct of each actor is a but-for cause of the harm, as shown
in Examples 1-4, from cases where neither actor is a but-for
reason from the harm, as is the case in Example 5. To be able to
distinguish between these cases, courts will have to determine: (a)
the subjective value the tortious actors place on the wrongful
activity (e.g., whether it is $20, $16, etc.); and (b) the subjective
value the tortious actors place on competing activities (e.g., sun
bathing) that constitute the wrongdoers' opportunity costs. Courts
cannot determine subjective valuations. Even if courts attempted
to do so (an attempt that is destined to fail), the result would be a
fatal moral hazard. A defendant will always try to argue that she
would not have acted the way she did but for the others' tortious
actions. This could chill welfare-enhancing activities or result in
wasteful investment in care.
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One possible solution-the one adopted by courts-is to shift
the burden in all of these cases to defendants.1 15 The solution
requires defendants to show that their activity was not a but-for
cause of the victim's harm.11 6 Overcoming the presumption that
results from the burden shifting may seem-and probably is-an
insurmountable task. If what underlies the presumption is the
plaintiffs inability to prove that a tortious actor was a but-for
reason for her harm, it could be equally impossible for defendants
to exculpate themselves.11 7 This means that the spectator in the
drag race, the campers who carelessly set fires that merged, and
the hunter who missed Summers will all be held liable.
While it is true that the presumption imposed on tortious
defendants is likely to be impossible to rebut, this is not a serious
concern for at least three reasons. First, tort law limits the pool of
actors that are subject to group causation theories. In concerted
action, the pool is limited to those actors who agreed with, incited,
and encouraged the injurers.1 16 In concurrent causes cases, the
pool of defendants is limited to those who physically contributed to
the harm (examples include polluting factories as in Tidal Oil or
tortious actors whose fires merged).11 9
And, in alternative
liability, the pool may be even more limited. 120 Second, each of the
injuring and non-injuring actors behaved tortiously. Finally, and
perhaps more importantly, the imposition of liability fulfills two
functions: it compensates the victim and incentivizes the actors to
engage tortiously in the activity when doing so is welfare
enhancing. The actors who behave tortiously take the risk that
115 See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (shifting the burden to defendants).

n1 See id. at 4 (arguing that each of the defendants has the burden to prove that the
other's behavior was the sole cause of the victim's harm).
117 Compare Summers, 199 P.2d at 4 (arguing that "defendants are in
a far better position
[than the plaintiff] to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury"), with
Geistfeld, supra note 14, at 473 ("But neither defendant in Summers had better access to
the evidence than the plaintiff ...), and Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the
Individual CausationRequirement in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873,
901 (2005) (arguing that the "realistic effect" of burden shifting doctrines like the one
announced in Summers "has been to impose liability [on the defendants] without proof of
individual causation because, in actuality, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can prove
which injurer's acts caused [the victim's harm]").
n1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPOINTMENT OF LIAB. § 15 reporters' note, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (discussing the
scope of liability under concerted action theory).
us RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
120 Id. § 433B.
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their actions would place them under such a burden. They will
thus engage in the activity if they value the activity more than its
expected cost (as in Example 5), or if they expect to be part of a
larger group and thus anticipate that their liability would be
diluted enough to justify their actions (Examples 1-4). In either
case the result is justified on economic grounds. It also leaves the
ultimate decisions of whether to act and how much care to take
with the tortious injurer-the party who is in the best position to
make these decisions.
Such an impossible presumption is not foreign to tort law. In
fact, courts use such a presumption when they apportion damages.
The issue arises when multiple actors cause the victim an
indivisible harm. Regularly, the plaintiff has the burden to prove
not only that she was harmed, but also the extent of the harm
caused by each defendant. When the harm is divisible, the
mission is simple. But when the harm is indivisible (as in the case
of merging fires), insisting on requiring the plaintiff to divide an
indivisible harm would doom her case. For this reason, in cases of
indivisible harm, courts shift the burden of proof to the
defendants. 121 Courts not only explicitly admit that they impose
an impossible burden, but they also analogize the problem to the
two-fire hypothetical where injurers would escape liability if they
are allowed to rely on what is believed to be a failing but-for test:
Nobody doubts that if two tortfeasors contribute to a
single loss, each is liable in solido. This result is
however scarcely logical so long as the injured person
has the burden of showing that the tortfeasor whom he
pursues caused the damage and how much he caused.
On the other hand, since it is impossible to prove what
share the act of either of the tortfeasors contributed, or
whether it contributed any at all, if this prevailed,
each would escape-an absurd result. To overcome
this difficulty, the law imposes upon each tortfeasor
the impossible burden of proof.... The situation is the
same when one of the two contributingfactors is not the

121

Id.

§

433B(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 28 (shifting the burden of proof as to the apportionment to the tortious actors who
exposed the victim to a risk of harm); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 168, at 410,
§ 174, at 423 (2000); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 52, at 345.
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result of an actionablefault: again, the single tortfeasor
cannot be allowed to escape through the meshes of a
logical net. He is a wrongdoer; let him unravel the
casuistriesresulting from his wrong.12 2
Not surprisingly, the Summers court-the oft cited case for
alternative liability-drew the exact same analogy:
[I]t should be pointed out that the same reasons of
policy and justice shift the burden to each of
defendants to absolve himself if he can-relieving the
wronged person of the duty of apportioning the injury
to a particular defendant, apply here where we are
concerned with whether plaintiff is required to supply
evidence for the apportionment of damages.
If
defendants are independent tort feasors and thus each
liable for the damage caused by him alone, and, at
least, where the matter of apportionment is incapable
of proof, the innocent wronged party should not be
deprived of his right to redress. The wrongdoers
should be left to work out between themselves any
apportionment.1 2 3
Finally, the presumption suggested here might seem odd, but
only because it is framed as such-that is, as a presumption.
Indeed, concerted action, substantial factor, and alternative
liability theories can be viewed as presumptions of a but-for nexus
that courts are willing to apply in limited settings (situations
where these group theories are applicable).

122 Navigazione Libera Triestina Societa Anonima v. Newtown
Creek Towing Co., 98 F.2d
694, 697 (2d Cir. 1938) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("The reason for the exceptional
rule placing the burden of proof as to apportionment upon the defendant or defendants is
the injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer . .. to escape liability. . . .").
123 Summers, 199 P.2d at 5 (emphasis added); see also Wright, supra
note 9, at 1300-01
(relying on a fairness rationale and arguing that in apportionment and alternative causes
cases "the shift of the burden of proof ... to the defendants is warranted as an
implementation of interactive justice").
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B. THE SUBSTITUTION HYPOTHESIS

The theory pressed in this Article offers a unified explanation
for the three paradigmatic cases. But if the three paradigmatic
cases are as similar as this Article claims, one would expect courts,
at least on the margins, to treat them as interchangeable. There is
indeed evidence that courts are willing to substitute one group
causation theory for another. Consider, for example, the following
hypothetical. Suppose A and B play paintball in a secluded area
and ask C to warn them if someone approaches. C notices an
innocent party, V, and warns the players, but A and B decide
independently, while aware of each other's decision, to ignore the
warning and shoot at each other simultaneously. One of them,
although it is not clear who, hits V. The Restatement (Third)
explains that A and B may be liable under alternative liability
theory. 124 One could also argue that the parties engaged in
Although the common plan-a game of
concerted action.
paintball-was not intended to harm another, it was nevertheless
pursued with disregard to the bodily and property interests of
125
third parties. It is thus not different than the horseplay in Keel,
or the drag race that involves participants who enjoy the thrill of
the ride, but do not intend to harm anyone.126
In fact, many courts have taken the view that in such cases the
plaintiff can recover under a theory of concerted action, alternative
liability, or both. 127 McMillan ex rel. McMillan v. Mahoney is such
a case. 128 In McMillan, the two defendants were shooting air rifles
next to the plaintiffs' home without any intention to injure
anyone. 129 One of them hit the victim, but it was impossible to

124

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 28(b) cmt. d, illus. 12 (discussing the above example).

125 See Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 399-400 (Okla. 1958) (noting that although the
defendants did not act with the intent to harm, their actions were dangerous and therefore
"wrongful" and holding liable all participants, including Keel, even though his actions were
"limited to the retrieving of such erasers and handing them to other defendants for further
throwing"). See also supranotes 85-89 and accompanying text.
126 See supra p. 5.
127 See, e.g., McMillan ex rel. McMillan v. Mahoney, 393 S.E.2d 298, 300 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990) (reviewing such decisions and concluding that "[nlumerous cases from other
jurisdictions allow a plaintiff to recover either under [alternative liability] theory, under a
theory of 'acting in concert,' or under some combination of the two").
128 Id. at 301.
129 Id. at 299.
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determine who.130 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that "the complaint is fatally defective in that it fails to
allege concerted action and the facts as stated clearly indicate that
only one of the minor defendants actually caused the injury for
which plaintiffs seek recovery."13 1 In a case of first impression, the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina rejected the motion to dismiss
and found that the plaintiff could recover under a theory of
concerted action, alternative liability, or both. 132
Famous examples of two courts applying different group
causation theories to near identical situations are Oliver v. Milesl33
and Summers v. Tice.1 34 In Oliver, Shamburger and Oliver drove
to the countryside to hunt birds. Shortly after their car passed
Miles, they stopped to shoot at a covey of partridges.1 35 When the
birds flew over their heads and across the public highway, they
simultaneously shot at the birds. One of the hunters struck
Miles's eye. Unable to identify the actual shooter, the court held
both liable based on a concerted action theory.1 36 "To hold
otherwise," the court explained, "would be to exonerate both from
liability."1 37 The Summers court took a different approach. Like
the court in Oliver, it held the two careless hunters liable, but it
noted that using concerted action theory would be "straining that
concept."1 38 Instead, Summers fashioned what is now known as
alternative liability to achieve the same result, explaining that the
"real reason . . . is the practical unfairness" to the victim.1 39 "If one
can escape [liability] the other may also and plaintiff is
remediless."1 40

Id.
Id. at 300.
132 See id. at 301 ("[U]nder the recognized tort theories discussed
above [i.e., alternative
liability and concerted action] the complaint alleges facts sufficient to give defendants
notice of the theory under which plaintiffs are proceeding.").
133 Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1926).
134 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
130
131

131 Oliver, 110 So. at 667.
136 Id. at 668 ("We think

that they were jointly engaged in the unlawful enterprise of
shooting at birds flying over the highway; that they were in pursuit of a common purpose;
that each did an unlawful act, in the pursuit thereof; and that each is liable for the
resulting injury to the boy, although no one can say definitely who actually shot him.").
137

Id.

138

Summers, 199 P.2d at 3.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 4.
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The similarity between the different group causation theories
(and the rhetoric that courts used to justify them) is further
exemplified in Moses v. Town of Morganton-a concurrent causes
case. 141 Moses involved three defendants that, although acting
independently, were aware of each other's actions. Two of the
defendants discharged waste into a creek above the plaintiffs
land.142 The third defendant built a dam in a different location,
which caused the water in the creek to back up, resulting in a
143
deposit of the discharged waste onto the plaintiffs land.
Importantly, the court found that each of the defendants acted
independently and without agreement. 144 Yet, it held each liable
based on what is viewed as concerted action theory: 145
If parties, although acting independently, know, or
have reasonable ground to believe, that their
independent acts, combining with the independent
acts of others, will create a result that will become a
nuisance, and they do so causing damage, they become
as it were joint wrongdoers ab initio, and are liable as
joint tort-feasors. Where all have knowledge of the
independent acts that create the result and continue
the independent acts with knowledge, this ipso facto
creates a concert of action and makes a common design
Any other position . .. would make
or purpose.
plaintiffs practically remediless, although there is a
nuisance which all jointly concurred in and contributed
to, that is alleged made the plaintiffs' land valueless,

141 Moses v. Town of Morganton, 133 S.E. 421 (N.C. 1926). For a critical view of Moses,
see PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 46, at 323 (arguing that Moses is a concerted
action case which requires an actual agreement and that "mere knowledge by each party of
what the other is doing" is not enough). However, for a response, see generally J. Shahar
Dillbary, Tort-tracting (work in progress) (on file with author) (explaining that the criticism
is unwarranted).
142 Moses, 133 S.E. at 421.
143

Id.

See id. at 422 (finding that the parties "acted independently, without concert or
collusion and not in pursuit of any common design").
145 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 46, at 323.
144
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and but for such joinder the injury would not have
occurred.146
The Moses court's reliance on deterrence and fairness to allow
recovery for an otherwise remediless victim is identical to that in
Summers, Oliver, and Keel. 147 And, for this reason it is wrong.
Group causation theories like concerted action, substantial factor,
and alternative liability theory serve as a dilution mechanism.
They may thus encourage, not reduce, accidents. But, the Moses
holding is correct in emphasizing the fact that the parties' actions
"concurred" and "contributed" to the harm. 148 The facts in Moses
are quite similar to the facts of Tidal Oil-another concurrent
causes case. 149 And in both cases, tort law, with the aid of a group
causation theory, imposed liability on all actors and then diluted
it, thereby encouraging the parties to pursue the tortious
activities.1 50
C. TORT LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW

Thus far, for the ease of exposition and exposing the dilutive
effect of group causation theories, this Article has ignored the
effects of the criminal system on the actors' behaviors. In many
cases the same acts or omissions can give rise to both criminal and
civil liability. Substantial factor theory, for example, may be used
to establish causation and hold liable those who set fires that
destroyed the victim's cabin, although the same acts may give rise
to criminal liability.
In McMillan, 15 1 the court held that
146 Moses, 133 S.E. at 423 (emphasis added); see also Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S.
725,
727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1904) ("[W]hile each defendant acts separately, he is acting at the same
time in the same manner as the other defendants, knowing that the contributions by
himself and the others acting in the same way will result necessarily in the destruction of
the plaintiffs property. If necessary, in order to get at them, a court . .. may infer a unity of
action, design, and understanding, and that each defendant is deliberately acting with the
others in causing the destruction of the plaintiffs property."), aff'd, 93 N.Y.S. 1009 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1905), aff'd, 78 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1906).
147 See supra notes 85-89, 133-37, 138-40 and accompanying text.
14s Moses, 133 S.E. at 423.
149 In both, neither actor alone could have brought the harm, nor was it
clear that any of
the actors was a "necessary" cause (it could be that the victim would have been harmed
even absent one of the polluters in Moses and some of the polluters in Tidal Oil). See supra
notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
1s0 The numerical example discussed in Section III.C above with regard to Tidal Oil can
apply with the same force to Moses.
151 McMillan ex rel. McMillan v. Mahoney, 393 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
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alternative liability could help the victim establish her case
against shooters who used air rifles in a residential area-acts for
which the defendants in similar cases, such as Regina v. Salmon 52
and United States v. Boyd, 153 were held criminally liable.
Concerted action cases are perhaps more likely to give rise to
both criminal and civil liability. Indeed, it is often noted that the
historical origin of the concerted action theory is the criminal
doctrine of aiding and abetting. 154 If that was ever the case, it is
now time for the concerted action theory to break away from its
roots. The two theories are fundamentally different. It is true
that both tort law's concerted action and the criminal concept of
aiding and abetting impose liability on a group of actors, including
non-injuring parties. 15 5 But, this is also where the similarity
between the civil doctrine and its criminal counterpart ends.
What courts have missed is that by imposing liability on a large
number of actors, tort law's concerted action theory could dilute
the injurer's incentives to take care thereby encouraging the actors
to behave tortiously. Criminal liability, on the other hand, does
the opposite. Criminal liability deters the parties by employing an
anti-dilution mechanism. When A and B engage in a criminal
activity in concert, each is subject to the same penalty, as if she
alone injured the victim. Importantly, criminal liability is not
apportioned between the participants. 15 6 If drag racing is subject

152 Regina v. Salmon, 6 QBD 79 (Eng. 1880), is the criminal equivalent of McMillan and
Summers. The three defendants fired from the same gun in a field bordered with roads and
houses. Their shots were directed at a board posted on a tree. None of the defendants
intended to harm anyone. But, one of them, although it was not clear who, hit and killed a
boy in a nearby garden. All were convicted of manslaughter.
153 United States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the defendant's
act of firing multiple shots in "the downtown of a large city when pedestrians ... are known
to be in the vicinity a risk of harm, while not large in probabilistic terms, is substantial
relative to the gratuitousness of the defendant's actions"). Boyd is discussed in Boim v.
Holy, Land Foundationfor Belief and Development, 549 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). See
supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
1ss See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., People v. Abbott, 445 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (1981) (affirming the conviction of
negligent homicide of each of the drivers in a drag race although only one injured the
victim); Com. v. Holstein, 927 A.2d 628, 633 (2007) ("[K]nowingly attend[ing] an illegal drag
racing event as a conscious and voluntary spectator . .. [is] sufficient to sustain [a]
conviction."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.251(A) (West 2016) ("Persons rendering
assistance in any manner to such competitive [street racing] of vehicles shall be equally
charged as the participants."). But see State v. Maravola, 198 N.E.2d 88, 88 (Ohio Ct. App.
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to a penalty of ten years, each party may receive the same penalty
whether two or five actors engaged in the race. In fact, in some
cases (e.g., felony murder), as the number of criminals increases,
the expected liability of each may increase as well. 15 7 The parties'
civil liability, however, could be diluted as the number of
If drag racing comes with an expected
tortfeasors increases.
liability of $90, each of two tortfeasors can expect a liability of $45,
but with nine tortfeasors each can expect to be liable only for $10.
One may argue that in cases where the same behavior can give
rise to both criminal and civil liability, the effect of concerted
action theory is only compensatory. There is some truth to the
argument. When it comes to activities that are at the core of the
criminal justice system, criminal liability may provide the antidilution mechanism that is missing in tort law. Still, even with
regard to crimes that would carry harsh penalties, it is important
to understand the effect of the tort system on the parties'
incentives. Since deterrence is achieved by the combined effect of
the criminal and civil systems, the issue is not trivial. Those
interested in a high level of deterrence would want to increase
criminal fines and penalties or impose high enough punitive
damages in cases where civil law corrodes the parties' liability.
Moreover, as an empirical matter, it is likely that in many
cases, civil liability is not accompanied by criminal liability.
Reasons vary. Some activities that would give rise to liability
under concerted action theory would not give rise to criminal
liability. Even if criminal liability could attach, it does not mean
that it would.
The prosecutors may refuse to initiate such
proceedings because of budgetary, political, or other reasons.
Victims may also refuse to press charges against some of the
actors, as was the case in Bierczynski.15 8 In that case, two drivers
engaged in a race. One driver, Race, hit the victims' car and the
other, Bierczynski, did not. 159 The victims sued and recovered
from both drivers with the aid of concerted action theory. Yet, on
the criminal front, they chose to press charges only against the
injurer, Race, although under criminal law the acts of both drivers

1963) (reversing the conviction of nine defendants who merely observed a drag race
explaining that mere observance does not mount to "assistance").
157 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
158 Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968).
159 Id. at 220.
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gave rise to criminal liability.1 60 The higher standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings may also increase the number of
behaviors that would be subject to civil but not criminal liability.
The contradictory impact of the criminal and civil systems is
puzzling. Why does the legal system use the criminal system to
deter actors from engaging in a certain behavior while at the same
time allowing tort law to dilute the incentive of the same actors to
take care? One possibility is that the dual system is purposefully
(even if not consciously) designed to allow the law to keep up with
changing moral norms. Such a dual system ensures that the
development
of tort
law-the
product
of judge-made
decisionmaking that is guided by efficiency principles-remains
uninterrupted. If enough people would like to engage in a socially
desirable activity, tort law allows them-in fact incentivizes
them-to do so by diluting their liability. If the legislature does
not want to respect the parties' private benefits, it can impose
criminal liability and adjust fines and penalties upwards, thereby
counteracting the effect of the tort system. Similarly, prosecutors
may devote more resources to go after such actors. If over time the
activity becomes less reprehensible or even acceptable, the
legislature can remove the criminal liability or prosecutors may
decide not to pursue charges. This explanation is consistent with
the common law efficiency hypothesis. 161
It may be appropriate to end this subsection with a cautionary
note. Courts and policy makers should be aware of this unique
institutional feature for at least three reasons. First, they should
be careful in drawing analogies between the tort-based concerted
action theory and the criminal doctrine of aiding and abetting,
even when both are applied to identical situations (e.g., drag
racing). At times, courts often ignore this point. In criminal cases
Id. at 222.
Although criminal law codifies many common rule principles, it is nevertheless codebased and, as such, is the product of those who are subject to lobbying and a myriad of
interests. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 297-98, 729-32 ("Judge made rules are more likely
to be efficiency-promoting than those made by the legislature-made rules" because "the rules
of adjudication make it difficult for interest groups even to be heard." In contrast, "[t]here is
no rule against taking into account the deserts of the people affected by proposed legislation"
in the legislative process). The criminal system, like punitive damages, may also increase
efficiency by channeling transactions to the market when a market exists. See POSNER, supra
note 11, at 240, 256 (explaining that some intentional torts and corresponding crimes "involve
not a conflict between legitimate (productive) activities but a coerced transfer in a setting of
low transaction costs"). See also supra note 25.
160
161
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involving multiple parties, courts sometimes draw an analogy to
tort cases applying group causation theories. 162 In tort cases they
rely on criminal decisions, although the group causation theory
that bears the same name leads to dramatically different
results. 163 The result could be over or under dilution of the parties'
liability and thus inefficient activity and precaution levels.
Second, those policymakers, enforcers, and judges who would like
to increase deterrence using the civil system should reduce the
number of liable actors, impose punitive damages, or use other
anti-dilution mechanisms. Finally, those who analyze the effect of
the legal system should not be swayed by the rhetoric of judges
and policymakers who may declare one goal, but legislate, enforce,
or interpret rules in a way that achieves another.
D. REEVALUATING CONCURRENT CAUSES' CAUSATION DOCTRINES

Thus far this Article has explained what the law does. It has
revealed that group causation theories incentivize actors to forgo
care and engage in dangerous activities that courts seem to
condemn and other areas of the law prohibit, but that efficiency
It has also explained why but-for causation is, or
welcomes.
should be presumed, present in cases where courts and scholars
insist that it has long been abandoned. The theory proposed here,
In fact, it has important
however, is not just descriptive.
By focusing on
implications for courts and policy makers.
concurrent causes situations as a case study, this Section seeks to
highlight some of these doctrines and normative implications. It
begins with a review of the substantial factor test and its
alternatives, including its newly adopted replacement-the NESS
(necessary element of a sufficient set) test. It then reveals that

162 See, e.g., State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 611-13 (Iowa 1982) (holding that there
is no reason to adopt a different causation standard under the criminal offense of
involuntary manslaughter than that under tort law); Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
881, 889-90 (2014) (analogizing a criminal case where a drug user died after consuming
multiple drugs, one of which was sold by the petitioner, to concurrent causes cases).
163 See, e.g., Agovino v. Kunze, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (citing People v.
Kemp, 310 P.2d 680, 683 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. (1957)) (relying on a criminal case where the
non-injuring driver was held liable for manslaughter to hold a non-injuring driver in a drag
race liable for the victim's injuries); Heick v. Bacon, 561 N.W.2d 45, 54 (Iowa 1997) ("This
definition of criminal aiding and abetting is not substantially different from the definition of
civil aiding and abetting."); Coopman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 508 N.W.2d 610, 613
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (agreeing that reliance on the criminal code "is a useful framework").
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these theories are overbroad and may have even been
mischaracterized.
It also shows that attempts to determine
whether a force is necessary, sufficient, overdetermined, or trivial
may be illusory. Armed with these insights, this Section turns to
illuminate some of the most controversial issues that have been
subject to debate.
1. Overdetermined Cases and Alternatives to the But-For Test.
One category of concurrent causes situations. that has preoccupied
courts and scholars for decades is that of "overdetermined-harm"
cases. These are cases where the victim's harm, so it is argued,
would have materialized regardless of the tortious behavior of any
one defendant. 164 The classic example is a situation where two
actors independently and tortiously set fires, each of which could
alone destroy the victim's cabin. 165 As with concerted action cases,
most courts and scholars have agreed that actual causation in
such cases is missing. 166 They explain that the but-for test
requires that the defendant's tortious conduct be a necessary
condition for the harm 167 and that the test fails for exactly this
reason: neither fire is necessary.16 8
To avoid a situation where both actors escape liability in such a
situation, courts have replaced the but-for test with alternatives.
The most widely used is the substantial factor test, famously

164 See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (1985)
("[Olverdetermined-causation cases ... [are] cases in which two or more factors each would
have been sufficient to produce the injury, so that none of them was a necessary condition
for the injury."); see also DOBBS, supra note 121, § 168 at 410, § 171 at 414 (noting that a
'special problem with multiple causes arises ... when either of two causes standing alone
would suffice to cause the plaintiffs injury"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmts. b, i, j (discussing causation theories when
multiple causes may have been sufficient for a harm).
165 See DOBBS, supra note 121, § 171, at 414 ("When each of two or more causes would be
sufficient ... a literal and simple version of the but-for test holds that neither ... is a cause
of the harm.").
166 Id. at 415 ("Cases like the two fires cases have consequently put the simple but-for test
in doubt and courts have in fact modified the test to deal with such cases"). See supra note 4
and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
166 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 266 (discussing the fire example and
noting that the but-for test fails in these situations); DOBBS, supra note 121, § 171, at 71415 (noting that "[t]he classic example is the case of two fires" one in which "[e]ither fire is
sufficient to burn the property" so that either defendant could "claim that he is not a cause
under the but-for rule").
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popularized by the Restatement (Second).169
Others have
suggested, and at least one court has adopted, collective causation
tests. 170 Under these tests the court asks whether the combined
conduct of all defendants, viewed as one unit, is a but-for cause of
the injury. 171 If it is, the conclusion establishes but-for causation
for each of the individual defendants in the group. 172 More
recently, Wright has advocated for, 173 and the Restatement (Third)
adopted, 174 a sufficiency test. To somewhat simplify, the test asks
whether the defendant's behavior is a necessary link (or element)
in a chain (set) of actual events that alone can cause the harm.1 75

169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (explaining that a
tortious behavior that alone could cause the harm is considered a cause of the victim's harm so
long as it was "a substantial factor in bringing [the harm] about); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 433A(2) cmt. i ("Where two or more causes combine to produce such a single result,
incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm ... each of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire
harm"); see also DOBBS, supra note 121, § 171, at 415 ("[The] test says that all defendants
who are substantial factors in the harm are causes in fact."); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 10, § 41, at 267-68 (arguing that the substantial factor test is an improvement over the
but-for test in these special cases). The substantial factor test applies also to situations
where one fire was the result of the defendant's tortious act and the other was the result of
a force of nature. DOBBS, supra note 121, § 171, at 415.
170 See Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994) (citing
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 268) (adopting a collective causation test and
noting that "the conduct of two or more persons" is the cause of an event if the conduct "is so
related ... that their combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event");
DOBBS, supra note 121, § 171, at 417 (explaining that causation is established under a
collective causation test if "the conduct of all defendants as a group is aggregated" and,
when "taken as a unit or set," is the but-for cause of the harm). Some even argue that
group causation theories, like alternative liability, can be viewed as such collective
causation rules.
See John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to
Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063, 1086 (1989) (noting
that in cases such as Summers, the courts impose liability "in each situation on independent
tortfeasors as a group even though proof of causation for any one of the tortfeasors was not
possible").
171 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 268.
172 Id.
173 Wright, supra note 164, at 1793; Wright, supra note 9, at 1303.
174

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

27 cmt.

a, illus. 1 (AM. LAw INST. 2010) (discussing the fires hypothetical and finding both actors to
be the cause of the victim's harm); id. § 26, reporters' note, cmt. j (noting that the
"substantial-factor test has not ... withstood the test of time, . . has proved confusing, and
[has] been misused"). The Restatement (Third) adopted the causal set model, which is
consistent with Professor Wright's NESS test. For an explanation of the NESS theory, see
id. § 26 cmt. c ("A useful model for understanding factual causation is to concede of a set
made up of each of the necessary conditions for the plaintiffs harm.").
175 Wright, supra note 164, at 1793.
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If so, causation is established.1 7 6 According to the NESS, in the
merging fires example, there are two potential "chains," each
consisting of one of the fires and the victim's house. Because each
fire is a necessary link in a chain and each chain alone is sufficient
for the occurrence of the harm, each fire is considered a cause of
the harm. In other words, each fire is a necessary element of a
sufficient set (NESS). The result does not change if two fires were
necessary to cause the harm, but six fires merged and destroyed
the victim's property. Here, each of the six fires is a NESS cause
because each fire is a necessary element in a set that included one
of the other five fires. 177
The NESS test adopted by the Restatement (Third) is a clever
"solution." 178 Its purpose is to provide an analytical framework in
"overdetermined-causation cases that the [but-for] test fails to
handle properly." 179 But, it may be a "solution" for a problem that
does not always exist. This Article is the first to show that, what
some may easily and mistakenly perceive as a situation of
duplicative (or overdetermined) causes, could in fact be a situation
that can be handled by the but-for test. To see this, reconsider
Example 1D,18 0 but assume that instead of hunters, the parties are
factories. For convenience, the example is summarized below:
Two
Example 6: Overdetermined Causes.
factories, Fl and F2, are located next to a $90 lake.
Production brings an expected benefit of $50, but the
process will completely destroy the lake. Each factory
can avoid harming the lake if it installs a $60 device.
Here, one factory alone would not produce (50<60, 90). On the
other hand, if each factory can be sure that another will join the
activity and be held liable, both will produce and neither will take
care. In such a case, each will expect a profit of $5 (50-90/2) and
total welfare will increase by $10 (50x2-90). Here, each factory is a

176

Id.

See id. (explaining that, according to NESS theory in the duplicative force case, each
fire is an actual cause because each "was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of actual
antecedent conditions that included only one of the other fires").
178 See id. at 1740-41 ("[The NESS test] resolve[s] the problematic causation cases that
have resisted solution under all the alternative tests.").
177

179
180

Id. at 1775.
See supra p. 31.
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but-for reason for the harm. Fl will not produce unless F2 joins
the activity and acts carelessly. Similarly, F2 will not engage in
the activity unless F1 produces without taking care. The point
here is that what may seem to be an overdetermined case is a
situation that can be analyzed under the traditional but-for test.
Example 6 and many of the previous examples illustrate that the
need for the NESS test may be overstated. 181
In cases where there is more than one sufficient set, the NESS
test adopted by the Restatement (Third) does not do away with
causation or the but-for analysis. 182 Rather, it requires that each
force is a necessary (or but-for) link in a chain of events that could
alone cause the harm.
However, the Restatement (Third)'s
explanation that the new standard "comports with deep-seated
intuitions about causation and fairness" 183 is less persuading. For
the reason explained in Section IV.A above, the substantial factor and
NESS tests can be effective dilution mechanisms. By increasing the
number of liable actors, they may reduce their expected liability and
consequently, their incentives to take care. The perhaps counterintuitive result from applying such theories is an increase in the
number of accidents.
For members of the law and economics
movement, this may be acceptable if the accidents are cost-justified.
For others, stating that the NESS test "comports with deep-seated

181 But this does not necessarily diminish the NESS test's ability to deal with such
situations. See supra note 177.
182 DOBBS, supra note 121, § 189 (criticizing the substantial factor test as one that
"avoid[s] causal analysis," is devoid of any reasoning and simply "invite[s] the jury's
intuition"); see also Wright, supra note 164, at 1802-03 ("[W]hen there is no
overdetermined-causation problem-that is, when there is only one actual or hypothetical
sufficient set of conditions for a particular event-the NESS test collapses into the simple,
traditional but-for test.").
183

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

27

cmt. c; Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2014) ("[It would be nonsensical to
adopt a rule whereby individuals hurt by the combined wrongful acts of many (and thus in
many instances hurt more badly than otherwise) would have no redress, whereas
individuals hurt by the acts of one person alone would have a remedy."); see also DOBBS,
supra note 121, § 171, at 415 ("The but-for test ... leads to a result that is almost always
condemned as violating both an intuitive sense of causation and good legal policy.");
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 268 ("The substantial factor rule was
developed primarily for cases in which the application of the but-for rule would allow each
defendant to escape responsibility . . . ."); Malone, supra note 8, at 89 (noting that in such
cases "[o]ur senses have told us that he did participate"); Robertson, supra note 78, at 1778
("[O]ur intuition tells us [that in concurring causes cases] the but-for test, normally so
reliable an analytical tool, suddenly turns unreliable.").
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intuitions about causation and fairness" may seem like a stretch
given that it may result in more accidents.
The second explanation adopted by the Restatement (Third) is
even more problematic. The claim is that exempting both actors from
liability would result in irony. It would make a victim that was
harmed by two tortious actors worse off compared to a victim that
was injured by one of them only. 184 The argument is that the irony is
avoided by holding both parties liable. But, the "solution" creates
another irony. The attempt to help the remediless victim may be the
very reason for her injury (although the result in many cases can be
justified on efficiency grounds).
2. Insufficient and Unnecessary Causes. One area where the
Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third) sharply diverge
is with regard to multiple insufficient and unnecessary causes.
The stark contrast can be illustrated by a hypothetical that has
already drawn much attention.185
and
Insufficient
Example
7:
Multiple
Unnecessary Causes. A, B, and C independently,
but simultaneously, lean on Ps car and as a result, the
car rolls and falls over a cliff. The force exerted by
each would have been insufficient to propel the car,
but the combined forces of any two of them would have
been sufficient.
Under Section 432(2) of the Restatement (Second), only when
each force is a sufficient cause could the substantial factor test
apply.1 86 Drawing on this section, Robertson explains that,
184

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

27

cmt. c ("When two tortious multiple sufficient causes exist, to deny liability would make the
plaintiff worse off due to multiple tortfeasors than would have been the case if only one of
the tortfeasors had existed."); see also Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Factand the
Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 967-68 (2001) (explaining that in
cases like the two-fire hypothetical insisting on the but-for test "would result in the victim
of two tortious acts being treated worse by the law than the victim of a single tortious act
(i.e., if he had only been shot at and hit by one careless hunter)," and explaining that
application of an alternative test is justified "on the basis that the legal concern with
upholding the 'dignity of the law' outweighs concerns with deterrence, fairness to
defendants, and so on").
185

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

27,

cmt. f, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
186

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("If two forces are

actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any
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because in the car hypothetical the forces exerted by neither A, nor
B, nor C alone are sufficient, they all should be exempted from
liability for lack of actual causation.18 7 On the other hand, the
Restatement (Third) treats the hypothetical as an example of an
overdetermined case.188 The force exerted by each of A, B, and C is
considered a NESS cause because each is a necessary element for
the sufficiency of a causal set that includes one of the other
actors. 1 8 9
Neither view is correct. Both Robertson and the Restatement
(Third) assume that the but-for test must fail in these cases, and
for this reason, both are wrong. It is easy to show that in many
cases like the car hypothetical there is simply no need for the
substantial factor or NESS tests. The traditional but-for test can
do the job. This can be illustrated if, for example, one assumes
that the value of Ps car is $90 and that each of the actors is
willing to pay $40 for the pleasure to lean for a few seconds on a

misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the
actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about." (emphasis
added)).
187 David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Three Arguable
Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1022 (2009) [hereinafter Robertson, Restatement
(Third) Three Mistakes]; see also Fischer, supra note 44, at 281 ("Courts and scholars
frequently explain the [substantial factor] exception to the but-for test as applying when the
competing forces are independently sufficient to cause the injury" and concluding that the
test "becomes relevant only in the case of 'multiple sufficient causes,'" as in the case of two
fires tortiously and independently set by different actors such that each alone could cause
the harm (emphasis added)); Robertson, supra note 78, at 1776 ("In the narrowest and only
fully legitimate usage, the term describes a cause-in-fact test that is useful as a substitute
for the but-for test in a limited category of cases in which 'two causes concur to bring about
an event, and either cause, operating alone, would have brought about the event absent the
other cause. . . .'" (citing Magee v. Coats, 598 So. 2d 531, 536 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Lejeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 So. 2d 471, 476-77 (La. 1978)))). But see Warren v.
Parkhurt, 92 N.Y.S. 725, 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1907) (holding liable each of twenty-six
defendant-mills, none of which was necessary or sufficient for the actual harm); Tidal Oil
Co. v. Pease, 5 P.2d 389, 391 (Okla. 1981) (holding liable each defendant for damages to
plaintiffs livestock even though no one defendant's actions were necessary or sufficient for
the actual harm); Fischer, supra note 44, at 286 (reviewing the case law and providing
additional examples).
18s

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

27

cmt. f, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that when "tortious conduct by one actor is
insufficient . . . [a] multiple-sufficient-casual-set situation" is created when it is combined
with the conduct of other actors because "the conduct overdetermines the harm" and
accordingly concluding that, in the car example, the behavior of each actor can be
considered a cause in fact).
1as Id.; Robertson, Restatement (Third) Three Mistakes, supra note 187, at 1022; see also
supra note 177 and accompanying text.

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

54

[Vol. 51:1

car that might fall (e.g., because they need the short rest or enjoy
the thrill of possibly propelling the car). One actor will lean on the
car because she will enjoy a benefit at no cost (it takes two to
propel the car). Two actors will not lean because the expected
liability of each, $45 (90/2), outweighs the expected benefit, $40.
Three actors, however, would be interested in the activity provided
they do so together for an expected net benefit of $10 (40-90/3).
The parties may agree to lean simultaneously or, without having a
verbal agreement, they can act in unison. Importantly, in such a
case, each actor's behavior should be considered a but-for reason
for Ps harm. A would not have caused the harm but for the fact
that B and C joined her. The analysis is identical for B and C.
The conclusion is that the forces exerted by each of A, B, and C are
each a but-for cause of the harm.
3. Trivial Contributions. But, what if more actors joined A, B,
and C such that the force exerted by each of them was trivial?
Should an actor whose tortious behavior contributed 1% of the
harm be liable for the entire harm? The answer seems to be "no"
under both Restatements. The Restatement (Second) does not take
an official position, but it notes that it would "perhaps be unjust"
to hold liable an actor whose contribution was a "relatively small
and insignificant part to the total harm."1 90 Section 36 of the
Restatement (Third) does not leave room for doubt. "When an
actor's negligent conduct constitutes only a trivial contribution to a
causal set that is a factual cause of harm under Section 27, the
harm is not within the scope of the actor's liability." 191
Against this consensus, the theory pressed in this Article shows
that, in some cases, but for the actor whose contribution to the
harm was trivial, the entire harm would not have happened. To
see why contrast Example 7 (the car hypothetical) 1 9 2 with
Robertson's version of that example. 193 In Robertson's example,
eight actors, A-H, leaned on the car. 194 The forces exerted by each
of A-G constituted thirty-three percent of the force necessary to
190

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

433B cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also id.

§ 433

(explaining that whether the substantial factor test should apply depends, among
other things, on "the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and
the extent of the effect which they have in producing it").
191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
193

See supra p. 52.
Robertson, Restatement (Third) Three Mistakes, supra note 187, at 1022.

194

Id.

192

§ 36.
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roll the car (that is, the combined forces of any three actors can
cause the harm). 195 The force exerted by the eighth actor, H,
constituted only one percent of the necessary force.1 96 Robertson
argues that H should and would be exempted for lack of actual
causation:
Under Restatement (Second) section 432(2), it is very
plain that [H]'s force was neither sufficient to bring
about the harm nor a substantial contribution to
bringing it about; clearly [H] should be exonerated on
factual-causation grounds.
Restatement (Third)
section 27 says that [H]'s conduct was a factual cause
of the harm. Thus section 27 is overinclusive. The
Reporters concede this, which in turn requires the
creation of Restatement (Third) section 36, so as to
exonerate [H] on scope-of-liability (proximate-cause)
grounds. 197
The Restatements and Robertson focus on the contribution of
(or force exerted by) each actor-whether it is 1%, 33% or 100%.
But, they miss the point. It could be that but for the actor whose
behavior contributed trivially to the harm, no one would have
behaved tortiously and the harm would not have occurred at all.
This is the lesson of Example 7,198 where the contribution of each
was not even a consideration in concluding that each actor who
leaned on the car was a but-for reason of the harm. To illustrate
this point further consider the following example:
Example 8: Trivial Contribution. A $90 lake will be
destroyed if 100 units of pollution are released. Four
factories, F1-F4, each released 500,000 units of
pollution into the lake. The fifth factory, F5 released
only 100 units. Taking care is impossible or too costly.
If each factory values the polluting activity at $20, the four
factories, Fl-F4, will not operate. If they do, they can only expect

195

Id.

196

Id.

Id. at 1022-23 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
198 See supra p. 52.
197
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a loss (20-90/4<0). But if F5 joins them and is also held liable (e.g.,
under strict liability), the five actors would be better off operating
and polluting. With a diluted expected liability of $18 (90/5), each
can expect a gain (20-18). The point here is that, but for the trivial
contribution (less than 1%) of F5, the harm would not have
happened. Importantly, the amount of pollution released by each
of the actors is of no consequence. Whether it was 500,000, 100, or
1 unit(s) of pollution, each of the five actors is a but-for cause,
equally responsible for the harm. Accordingly, the fact that F5s
contribution was a "relatively small and insignificant part to the
total harm"19 9 should not, without more, exempt her from
liability. 200
A similar mistake is made by Fischer. 201 Fischer provides an
example involving two polluting agents, X and Y, that is
reminiscent of the facts in Tidal Oil, Warren, and Example 8
above. 202 X discharges twenty-five units of pollution. At the same
time, Y discharges one unit. A minimum of fifteen units is enough
203
to kill a cow. Ps cow drinks the contaminated water and dies.
Like Robertson, Fischer concludes that "Ys unit of pollution was
not a cause of the cow's death because it was neither necessary nor
independently sufficient to kill the cow." 204 However, as Examples
7 and 8 demonstrate, whether Y is a cause should not be narrowly
205 It
decided based on the number of pollution-units it discharged.
could well be the case that, but for Ys action, X would not have
206
engaged in the activity to begin with.

199 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
200 The same can also be illustrated using Robertson's example. If each of A-G values
lying on the ground at $27.50, they will not lean on the car (40-90/7<27.50) unless joined by
H (40-90/8>27.50). Importantly, the amount of force exerted by each of the actors is of no
consequence. Whether it was 99% of the force or merely 1% of the force needed to push the
car, each of the eight actors is a but-for cause. Robertson, Restatement (Third) Three
Mistakes, supra note 187, at 1022.
201 Fischer, supra note 44, at 289 (suggesting that "[b]ecause [cases involving insufficient
causes] fall outside the core understanding of causation, courts should decide whether to
impose liability on parties who make unnecessary and insufficient contributions to injury by
making judgments based on either policy or intuition rather than on facts alone").
202 Id. at 278-79.
203 Id. at 278.
204 Id. at 281.
205 See discussion supra Sections IV.D.2, IV.D.3.
206 This assumes that the parties believed that liability would attach to all and thus be
diluted.
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V. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
A major goal of this Article is to describe what the law does.
The argument is that the deterrent effect of doctrines like
concerted action, substantial factor, and alternative liability has
been overly exaggerated; that these doctrines can dilute the actors'
incentives to take care and encourage them to engage in activities
courts denounce as immoral and antisocial; that, notwithstanding
statements to the contrary, courts respect the pleasure actors get
from engaging in condemned activities; and that courts and
scholars were too quick to conclude that the but-for test is wholly
inapplicable in these cases.
Still, the theory pressed here is modest in scope. To begin with,
this Article does not claim that dilution of liability is always
welfare-enhancing 207 or that it always encourages "wrongdoing."
As many of the examples discussed in this Article demonstrate,
there could be many cases where liability will not be diluted
enough to encourage actors to act tortiously. Indeed, Example 1the very example that opened this Article-illustrates that, in
some cases, group causation liability can deter actors (although as
the number of actors increases, the liability imposed on each would
lose its deterrent effect). 2 08 There we saw that a driver who
benefits $40 from speeding would find it in her best interest to
invest $35 in precaution to avoid an expected harm of $90.209 Two
drivers would also be deterred. By imposing liability on the
injuring and non-injuring drivers, concerted action would dilute
the expected liability of each to $45 (90/2), but the incentive to
take care would remain strong (35<45). However, if concerted
action held three actors liable, none would want to take care
(35>90/3). Moreover, this Article does not argue that every case in
which the three paradigmatic cases apply is congruent with the
but-for test, or that the model discussed here is always applicable.
A major limitation of the model is its reliance on the parties'
ability to engage in an ex ante cost-benefit calculation. In the drag
race hypothetical discussed in Example 1, the participants must be
able to estimate their expected liability. 2 10 Each should be able to
207
208
209
210

It is not. See Dillbary, supranote 24, at 995; supra note 25.
See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
See supra pp. 5-6.
See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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assess that if she acts alone, she will be subject to an expected
liability of $90, with another she will be subject to $45 (90/2), and
as part of a group of three she will be subject to $30 (90/3). To do
this, each party must be able to assess the benefits and costs of the
activity, understand that in case of an injury each of the
participants will be held liable, and be able to assess whether
enough participants would engage in the activity so that she can
expect a profit.211
These assumptions are realistic and likely to be present in
many cases. To begin with, each actor should be able to assess
how much she is willing to pay or accept to engage in a certain
The
activity-that is, to assess the expected benefits.
determination is not unique to tortfeasors. When one pays for a
hunting license, a ticket to participate in a game of paintball, or to
sit in a front row on a racetrack, she must value the activity (at
least ex ante) more than the amount she paid. So too is the case
with the professional driver who is enticed to participate in a race
for a certain salary or a promised prize; or the factory that decides
to erect a new production facility. Calculating the expected cost
requires a determination of the severity and probability of the
harm and, for this reason, may seem more complicated. But,
proxies are available. For example, in some cases, the actors can
simply estimate the maximum expected liability and use it as a
benchmark. 212
211 But see Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. ProbabilisticLinkage: The Bane of
Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 437, 439 (1985) (criticizing the economists' ex
ante approach and concluding that the actual causation requirement is "backward-looking"
and "incompatible" with welfare-maximization theory).
212 For example, polluters like those in Tidal Oil can easily determine the value of the
victim's property simply by visiting websites like Zillow.com. Similarly, the drag race
participants can assume that an accident may occur with certainty and they may be able to
estimate the damage to neighboring cars and pedestrians based on characteristics of the

neighborhood.

See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY

80 (2008) ("It is well established that the willingness to pay to avoid risk is highly
correlated with income."); Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 86-87
(2011) (explaining that because "in the rich neighborhood most people have a higher income
than the residents of the poor neighborhood" and because tort law awards more damages to
high-income victims, a driver will likely take "more care in the rich neighborhood than in
the poor one"); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 212-13 (2000) ("[B]ased on the usual benefit measures the value
of life for more affluent populations should be greater."). Estimating the expected value of
human life is not an exception. See, e.g., Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life Is
Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1891 (2006) (examining jury awards and finding that
compensation for the value of life ranged between approximately $2-$4 million).
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The second assumption-knowledge that all the participants
would be subject to liability-is also not a major obstacle. Actors
are likely aware that they could all physically injure the victim,
and if so, that they would all be held liable together (e.g., multiple
agents may be aware that their facilities would contaminate the
same reservoir). Moreover, the fact that almost every court and
the majority of scholars have relied on basic concepts of justice,
fairness, and morality to justify group causation theories also
implies that group liability should be expected. 2 13
The assumption that each actor can assess that some minimum
number of participants will engage in the activity is also
reasonable in many group causation cases. This is especially the
case in concerted action situations. In these cases, most courts
require an actual agreement between the parties. 214 Each party to
the agreement must thus be aware, at the very least, of the
number of parties with whom it contracted. In the drag race
examples, each participant would know or estimate the number of
participating drivers and the spectators who encouraged them.
The few courts that do not insist on an actual agreement require
that those "acting independently, know, or have reasonable ground
to believe, that their independent acts, combining with the
independent acts of others, will. . . caus[e] damage," and that "all
[participants] have knowledge of the independent acts that create
the result and continue the independent acts with knowledge." 2 15
It is this knowledge, the Moses court held, which "ipsofacto creates
a concert of action" that subjects them to group liability. 2 1 6

The Substitution Hypothesis implies that the assumption that
the parties are able to determine or estimate the number of
participants will likely hold in many concurrent and alternative
See supra note 8-12 and accompanying text.
See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 46, at 323.
215 Moses v. Town of Morganton, 133 S.E. 421, 423 (N.C. 1926).
216 Id. (emphasis added). See also Warren v. Parkhurt, 92 N.Y.S. 725, 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1904) ("[Wihile each defendant acts separately, he is acting at the same time in the same
manner as the other defendants, knowing that the contributions by himself and the others
acting in the same way will result necessarily in the destruction of the plaintiffs property.
If necessary, in order to get at them, a court ... may infer a unity of action, design, and
understanding, and that each defendant is deliberately acting with the others in causing
the destruction of the plaintiffs property."). On the classification of this case, compare
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 46, at 323 (viewing Moses as a concerted action
cases) with supra note 141 and accompanying text (characterizing Moses as a concurrent
causes case).
213

214
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liability situations. 217 In Tidal Oil, a concurrent causes case, the
court explained that "to make tort-feasors liable jointly there must
be some sort of community in the wrong-doing, and the injury
must be in some way due to their joint work, but it is not
necessary that they be acting together or in concert if their
concurring negligence occasions the injury." 2 18 Thus if D1 and D2
polluted a stream which they, and D3 who built a dam, knew
would harm the property of the victim, all are jointly liable under
the substantial factor doctrine. The assumption also holds in
many alternative liability cases. In both Summers and Oliver the
defendants were parties to a hunting group and were well aware of
the number of participants. 2 19
Still, there may be cases in which the parties could not engage
in ex ante calculations. A case where fires set by two tortious
campers who are not aware of each other is such an example. In
such cases, because the existence of another force is unpredictable
and improbable, the actor cannot expect that others would
shoulder her liability. Still, the model works well even in such
cases. It is true that a group causation theory like substantial
factor will dilute the parties' liability at the end of the day. If both
are held liable and are solvent, each will be responsible for a
But ex-ante, when the parties decide
fraction of the harm.
whether to engage in the activity, they cannot count on the
happenstance of another force. Even if they are aware of another
force, they may not know whether it originated due to the tortious
conduct of another. As a result, the fact that such actor's liability
would be diluted in trial due to a force of which she could not know
In such cases the
does not enter her ex-ante considerations.
parties' diluted liability is unlikely to erode the deterrent effect. 220
The model thus does not require that "courts have perfect
knowledge about each accident (including the ex ante expected
losses)" or that injurers, or the courts, be "omniscient" or
"know [ ] ... the magnitude and probability of all losses that may

See supra Section IV.B.
Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 5 P.2d 389, 391 (Okla. 1981); see also Northup v. Eakes, 178 P.
266, 268 (Okla. 1918) (relying on Tidal Oil's reasoning).
219 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948); Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666, 667 (Miss.
1926).
220 For an in depth analysis of such cases see Dillbary, supra note 141.
217
218
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Nor does it assume that "each tortfeasor
occur." 2 2 1
can . . . calculate . .. what conduct is efficient for every other
tortfeasor that might contribute to the risk." 22 2 Rather, the model

acknowledges that parties have limited knowledge, that ex ante
calculations are not always feasible, and that courts have limited
ability. In fact, it is the recognition of these limitations that
explains why the decision whether to act (and bear the possible
consequences of such acts) is deferred to market actors-the
potential wrongdoers.
The model comes with other benefits. In addition to shedding a
new light on what the law currently does, the model suggests
changes that would facilitate the adjudication process and, unlike
current doctrines and proposals, it does not require courts to do
the impossible. To illustrate, recall the car hypothetical involving
a group of actors leaning on a car (Example 7).223 Jurisdictions
that follow the Restatement (Second) must determine whether the
actions of each are sufficient. Only if they are does the substantial
factor doctrine apply. 2 2 4 Courts must also determine whether the
contribution of each actor to the total harm was trivial. An actor
whose contribution was trivial will be exempted from liability if
the jurisdiction follows the Restatement (Third) and may be
exempted if the Restatement (Second) applies. 225 Yet, in many
cases, the determination of whether a force was sufficient or trivial
is simply impossible. Indeed, the car hypothetical provided by the
Restatement (Third) and discussed by Robertson illustrates the
absurdity of providing the courts with such tasks. Can the nonomniscient court really determine the degree of force exerted by
each actor? What if some simply leaned on the car while others
also pushed it with their legs? Would the court be able to
determine whether each force was sufficient, necessary, or trivial?
Could the plaintiff (or anyone) provide evidence that would shed
221 Wright, supra note 211, at 445 (criticizing Shavell's model of causation); see also Feess
& Hege, supranote 44, at 422-23 (explaining that "[t]here is a substantial body of literature
showing that multiple causation does not constitute a serious obstacle to efficiency as long
as the court is fully informed about the circumstances of an accident" and noting that "[b]y
contrast, only very few contributions have examined problems of asymmetric information"
(emphasis omitted)).
222 Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68
VA. L. REV. 713, 745 (1982) (criticizing Landes and Posner's causation model).
223 See supra p. 52.
224 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
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light on these issues?
In the hypothetical world of the
Restatements, one can determine whether a force is sufficient or
trivial. One can also tell that the force exerted by A constituted
99% of the force necessary to roll the car and B only exerted 1%; or
that A-D exerted 25% of the force necessary (so they could
together propel the car) and E only exerted 5%. In real life, such
determinations are likely to be impossible. Moreover, even if
causation is established, the court will need to apportion liability.
The apportionment task-whether based on fault, relative
riskiness, or any other factor-seems illusory. 226
The model makes such illusory determinations unnecessary.
By defining the pool of injurers and assuming that each is a butfor cause of the harm, it relays the impossible task to defendants.
The costly apportionment regimes are substituted with a cheaply
administered pro-ration rule.
Finally, the model is not only
consistent with traditional doctrine, but it should also appeal to
the moralist as it requires the injurers to internalize the cost they
imposed on third party-victims in cases where the Restatements
should, but fail, to do so.
The examples used in this Article may raise other concerns,
namely that the examples are stylized, ignore the possible
interdependency between the parties' actions, and assume that the
expected harm to the victim is constant.
This is a strong
assumption. First, the severity of the harm, H, may increase with
the number of actors. Even if the severity of the harm is not
influenced by the number of tortfeasors, the probability, p, that an
accident will occur may increase as more actors join the activity.
For example, the expected harm, pH, from a drag race may be $90
in the case of two actors. Yet, as more drivers join the party, the
probability that a third party will be hurt may increase from p to
pi (pi>p) and if so, the expected liability would increase as well (to
piH>90). A more nuanced analysis is not only invited, but it may
also provide additional insights. But, the main argument remains.
226 Rizzo and Arnold, for example, provide a theory of causation that requires knowledge
of "relative riskiness of the causal agents." Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal
Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1426
(1980) (emphasis omitted). To illustrate their point, the authors discuss a situation in
which two tortfeasors simultaneously shoot, hit, and kill a victim. Under their proposed
theory, where one of the tortfeasors caused an injury that resulted in a 90% probability of
the victim's death while the other caused an injury resulting in a 45% probability of death,
the former must pay twice as much as the latter. Id. at 1410.
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In some cases, the expected liability faced by each actor can be so
diluted that the careless (and much condemned) activity will
become socially desirable. This can happen, for example, because
the maximum expected damage is capped and can be estimated. 22 7
In such a case the parties do not need to know what the
probability of an accident is if two actors engage in the activity.
Nor do they need to know whether and to what extent it would
increase if more actors partake in the activity. Indeed, even if the
actors assume that the accident (for example, pollution of a lake) is
certain to happen (p=l), they may be able to estimate the
maximum expected harm (for example, the value of the lake).
And, with enough actors, this maximum expected harm will
become so diluted as to make the activity worthwhile for each.
Moreover, the Article's claim is not that in every case each of
the injuring and non-injuring actors is a but-for cause of the harm.
Rather, it focuses on a narrow set of cases and it concedes, even
demonstrates, that in some cases the injurer alone is the cause of
the harm. 2 2 8 Yet, the Article shows that in many cases noninjuring actors are also but-for reasons for the harm. And, it
argues that in other cases, for policy reasons, each actor should be
treated as if she is a but-for reason for the harm.
VI. THE ONE-PARTY-PAYS-ALL RULE
Group causation theories-theories that hold injuring and nonBut are they
injuring participants liable-may be efficient.
by
other means?
result
be
achieved
necessary? Could the same
Thus far, following courts and scholars, this Article considered one
alternative to group causation theories: no liability. The choice
was between two options: (a) holding everyone liable (all the
drivers in a drag race, all the factories whose pollutants combined,
and all the hunters who shot carelessly); or (b) allowing these
actors to escape liability and leaving the victim remediless. One
important alternative that has been neglected by the prior
literature is a regime under which one party is solely liable for the
entire harm. In some cases the choice can be easy. In cases like
Bierczynski the law could hold liable the sole injuring driver-the

227

Another example is when the accrued benefits outpace the increase in expected harm.

See supra notes 110, 212 and accompanying text.
228

See supranotes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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one who crashed into the victim. In other cases, where multiple
actors injured the victim or in cases where it is impossible or too
costly to identify the injurer, courts could devise mechanisms to
choose the unlucky actor who would alone bear the entire burden.
For example, liability could be imposed randomly on one of the
drivers in Bierczynski, on one of the polluters in Tidal Oil, or on
one of the careless hunters in Summers.
Is the one-party-pays-all rule as efficient as a group causation
theory? One could argue that it is. After all, the expected benefits
and costs under group causation theories and the one-party-paysall rule seem the same. To see this, consider again the drag race
in Example 1. There, each of the three drivers expects a benefit of
$40 and must spend $35 to avoid an expected damage of $90.
Under concerted action theory, all drivers-the injuring and noninjuring ones-will be held liable. Accordingly, if all act carelessly,
each will expect to shoulder 1/3 of the $90 damage, or $30, and
thus expect a gain of $10 (40-30). Consequently, forgoing care
would make all better off (10>40-35). Under the one-party-paysall regime, the parties would face the same expected cost and
benefits. At the start of the race, each driver knows that if she
drives carelessly, the probability that she will be the one to hit the
victim (and thus be held liable for the entire harm of $90) is 1/3.229
She can thus expect to pay $30 (1/3x90) and gain $10 (40-30).
In the example above, the application of a group causation
theory like concerted action and the one-party-pays-all rule lead to
the same result. The reason is that, to incentivize each participant
to drive carelessly, it is not necessary to hold all drivers liable for
the entire harm. Rather, it is enough that every driver is at risk of
being liable. Still, there are good reasons to prefer a group
causation theory over the one-party-pays-all rule (beyond the
public upheaval that the latter rule may generate):
1. Holding Constant Ex Ante Expectations. Group causation
theories enjoy an important advantage over the one-party-pays-all
regime: they ensure that the expected cost of the accident remains
diluted throughout the activity. Consider again the drag race
example with three drivers. At every point of the race, each driver
should expect to pay one third of the damage or she will withdraw.
Concerted action theory ensures the drivers that the expected

229

Assuming, for simplicity, that only one driver can be the injurer.
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liability will indeed remain diluted. A driver who wishes to quit
the race will remain liable unless she communicates her decision
in a way that leaves the other participants enough time to
reconsider their actions. This is the teaching of cases like Lemons
v. Kelly. 2 30 In Lemons, two cars, one driven by Kelly and the other
by King, engaged in a drag race. 231 The two cars were driving next
to each other when at one point, just before the highway entered a
series of curves, Kelly overtook King. 2 32 Kelly later lost control
and as a result his passenger, Lemons, was injured. 233 At trial,
Kelly and King argued that the race had ended about a mile before
the accident occurred when Kelly passed King-an argument the
victim seems to have admitted. 234 Despite the victim's admission,
the court sustained the verdict for the plaintiff. "[O]ne who
participates in setting hazardous conduct [like a drag race] in
motion cannot later be heard to say: 'Oh! I withdrew before harm
resulted even though no one else was aware of my withdrawal.' "235
In contrast, under the one-party-pays-all regime, the drivers
cannot be confident that their liability will remain diluted. At the
beginning of the race, each driver may believe that she has a 1/3
chance at bringing about the $90 harm, but the assessment may
quickly change. For example, if one driver loses sight of the
others, that driver may not be able to tell whether the other
drivers remained in the race. The other drivers may have similar
concerns regarding the missing driver. As a result, all drivers may
adjust their expectations and alter their behavior accordingly.
2. Dilution of Liability and Non-Injuring Parties. The oneparty-pays-all regime could also lead to inefficient results. The
reason is that the one-party-pays-all rule is an inferior dilution
mechanism. By definition, it does not impose liability on actors
who cannot potentially injure the victim. The result could be overdeterrence. To illustrate, consider again the drag race with two
drivers and one spectator discussed above. Under the one-partypays-all rule, because there are only two potential injurers (the
two drivers) each driver can expect to pay $45 (90/2) and,
accordingly, each would take care (40-35>0>40-90/2). In contrast,
230

397 P.2d 784 (Or. 1964).

231 Id. at 785.
232
233
234
235

Id.
Id.
Id at 785-86.
Id. at 787.
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if the parties are subject to a group causation theory like concerted
action, neither will take care, which is the efficient result.
Concerted action is a more effective dilution mechanism because it
imposes liability on the drivers and the spectator. As a result,
each of the two drivers can now expect liability to be split three
ways, thereby making driving carelessly worthwhile (40-90/3>4035).
3. Eliminatingthe Bad Driver. The one-party-pays-all rule may
be less effective when actors are not identical. Consider the three
drivers who would like to race, but assume now that one of them is
a worse driver than the others in the sense that she is more likely
to injure the victim. A version of the one-party-pays-all rule that
holds liable only the driver who physically injured the victim may
initially look attractive. This version of the rule could cause the
bad driver, who on average can expect to pay more compared to
her fellow drivers, to either forgo the activity or take more care.
The result may seem fair, but it would be inefficient because, but
for the careless behavior of the bad driver, the socially beneficial
race may not take place. 2 36 In contrast, under a group causation

regime, tort law supplies a mechanism under which the better
drivers subsidize the bad driver (by sharing the cost of the injury
inflicted by that driver). But they do so gladly, since but for the
careless participation of the bad driver, they would not enter the
race they (and society) value.
4. Deviation from Traditional Tort Law. The one-party-paysall rule would constitute a deviation from traditional tort law
principles without countervailing benefits. The reason is that each
actor-those who injured the victim and those who did not-is (or
should be deemed) a but-for reason for the victim's harm. And
once this becomes clear, there is simply no reason to exculpate the
non-injuring actors or choose randomly one actor to bear the entire
cost for which others are equally responsible. If each had a duty
that she breached, and each was a cause (actual and proximate) of
the harm, each actor should be held liable. Viewed this way, the
one-party-pays-all regime exempts from liability actors who
committed a tort, and for this reason, represents an undue
deviation from traditional tort law.

236

This assumes that the parties cannot contract around the rule at low cost.
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5. Social Insurance. An important assumption that underlies
the application of the one-party-pays-all rule is that all parties are
risk-neutral. The assumption is valid if a functioning market for
insurance exists. But in the three paradigmatic cases discussed,
the actors may not be able to purchase liability insurance. One
reason is that they may be considered parties to intentional torts
and may even be subject to punitive damages.
Certain
jurisdictions deny insurance coverage for torts committed
intentionally, 2 3 7 and as a matter of contract, liability insurance
generally excludes coverage for intentional torts. 238
Others
jurisdictions may find invalid a policy to insure what they believe
to be an immoral activity or criminal conduct. 23 9 Absent access to
insurance markets, actors may behave as risk-averse and, as a
result, decline to engage in harmful yet socially beneficial
activities. In contrast, a group causation theory provides the

237 For
a list of states prohibiting insurance coverage for punitive damages see
Christopher Yetka, Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Practice
19, 25 (2014). For decisions denying coverage of torts committed intentionally on public
policy grounds, see Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145,
149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) ("[T]he policy of law forbid[s] one who had intentionally killed
another to collect the insurance on his life. . . ."); Hussar v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of Am., 252
So. 2d 374, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (explaining that public policy does not permit
recovery for "intentionally and voluntarily self-inflicted injuries"); U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v.
Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983) ("The Florida policy of allowing punitive damages
to punish and deter those guilty of aggravated misconduct would be frustrated if such
damages were covered by liability insurance."); Bohrer v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 965 P.2d
1258, 1262 (Colo. 1998) ("[I]t is contrary to public policy to insure against liability arising
directly against the insured from intentional or willful wrongs, including the results and
penalties of the insured's own criminal acts." (internal quotations omitted)). But see
Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth That Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or
Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 65, 101 (2012) (arguing
that in some cases insurance coverage may be available for certain intentional torts).
23 See, e.g., Yetka, supra note 237, at 22 ("[S]tandard liability policies generally are
written to exclude 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured." (citing ISO Commercial Gen. Liab. Coverage Form CG 00 01 12
07, § I.A.2.a)).
239 See, e.g., Everglades Marina, Inc. v. Am. E. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 1979)
("[Piublic policy precludes recovery under an insurance policy when the insured has
committed a criminal act with known and necessary consequences."); Perreault v. Maine
Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 A.2d 1100, 1102 (Me. 1990) ("[T]he general rule [is] that insurance
to indemnify an insured against his or her own violation of criminal statutes is against
public policy and, therefore, void." (quoting Altera v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d
485, 490 (Iowa 1988))); Goldsmith v. Green, 47 So. 3d 637, 641 (La. Ct. App. 2010) ("[Nlo
reasonable policy holder would expect for his own intentional criminal acts to be
insured. . . ."); see also supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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injurers with a social insurance. In all but one jurisdiction, 240 the
tortfeasors are either subject to several liability or joint and
Each of n
several liability with a right of contribution.
even
if
she
physically
injures the
thus
knows
that,
participants
victim, she can expect to pay only a fraction, 1/n, of the harm
(assuming solvency).
Ironically, group causation theories not only give priority to the
interests of the tortious actors over the victim's interest in her
body and property, they also provide social insurance for the very
risky activities they purport to condemn. Moreover, the victim,
being a member of that society, subsidizes the tortfeasors' actions.
The conclusion is that the moralist, who prefers to reduce the
number of accidents, should prefer the one-party-pays-all rule
(e.g., the injurer-pays-all version). In contrast, group causation
theories provide injurers with a stronger dilution mechanism and
an insurance feature, and accordingly, lead to more accidents.
VII. CONCLUSION

Courts have developed different theories to hold defendants
liable even when the injury was clearly inflicted, or could have
been inflicted, by others. They easily-too easily-admit that they
relax or abandon the actual causation requirement, but they
explain that they do so on two major policy grounds. The first is
fairness to the victim, who was injured by a group of tortious
actors and would remain remediless if the courts applied the
traditional but-for test. The second is deterring actors from
engaging in activities the law deems antisocial, often declares
illegal, and even subjects to criminal liability.
The Article challenges these arguments. It is the first to offer a
unified and consistent theory to all three major group causation
paradigms: concerted action, concurrent causes, and alternative
liability. The theory reveals that group causation theories are not
Rather, imposing liability en masse may
designed to deter.
decrease the parties' incentives to take care and encourage them to
engage in harmful activities-a result that some would consider
unjust. Moreover, this Article uncovers that, despite the courts'
240 Alabama is the only jurisdiction that has retained the common law's no contribution
rule. Susan Randall, Only in Alabama: A Modest Tort Agenda, 60 ALA. L. REV. 977, 980
(2009); Dillbary, supra note 17, at 1732.
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rhetoric, group causation theories do so by giving weight to the
subjective values that tortious actors place on harmful and
dangerous activities. The theory pressed here, however, argues
that the result can be justified on efficiency grounds, and it
explains why, and under what conditions, these lamented
activities are socially desirable and encouraged.
The Article also shows that the determination as to whether
forces are sufficient, necessary, or trivial could be illusory.
Another important insight is that imposing ("too much") liability
on actors who did not physically injure the victim and imposing
("too little") liability on the injurer, can increase total welfare.
What courts and scholars missed is that a non-injuring tortious
party (or each of the injurers in what is referred to as an
"overdetermined" case) can be an actual cause of the victim's
injury, and should thus be equally responsible with the injuring
parties for the entire harm. This Article is thus the first to reveal
that courts, scholars, and the Restators have all been too quick to
concede that the but-for test is inapplicable in the three
paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, this Article suggests a more
prominent role for the but-for test in causation analysis.

